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INDIANA'S APPROACH TO CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: A FRUSTRATION OF FAMILY INTEGRITY
HUGO E. MARTZ*
And a woman who held a babe against
her bosom said, Speak to us of Children.
And he said:
Your children are not your children.
They are the sons and daughters of Life's
longing for itself.
They come through you but not from you,
Any though they are with you yet they
belong not to you.
You may give them your love but not
your thoughts,
For they have their own thoughts.
You may house their bodies but not
their souls....
You are the bows from which your children
as living arrows are sent forth.
The archer sees the mark upon the path
of the infinite, and He bends you with His
might that His arrows may go swift and far.
Let your bending in the archer's hand
be for gladness;
For even as He loves the arrow that flies,
so He loves also the bow that is stable.
Kahlil Gibran**
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally the family provided the primary source of educa-
tion, health services, employment and recreation. The family was
* Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the Clinical Program, Val-
paraiso University School of Law; Purdue University (B.S., 1960); Indiana University
(LL.B., 1962); University of Missouri (M.S., 1965).
** THE PROPHET (1923). Gibran's words are especially appropriate in the year
1979-designated as the International Year of the Child.
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the focal point of the child's life.' Legally parents were thought to
have a natural or inalienable right to raise their children as they
saw fit.! In this century the family shares to a greater extent than
ever before the responsibility for teaching, caring, and disciplining
children with other institutions such as schools, welfare agencies,
child care centers, and hospitals. Compulsory education, child labor,
and abuse and neglect laws have been enacted in order to protect
children and assure their normal development. Nevertheless the
primary responsibility for child-rearing remains with the family.8
Associated with this parental sharing of child-rearing respon-
sibility with the state, has been the state's legislative assumption of
the specific power to intervene. The state has only that authority to
intervene which the citizens grant it. There is no express authoriza-
tion by the people in the United States Constitution granting the
government the power to regulate family life. Under the Ninth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, the people retain all
of those rights, including broad child-rearing authority, which are
not expressly limited in the Constitution.'
That authority granted the government is limited to
legislatively created means to protect the health, safety and
1. K. KENISTON, ALL OUR CHILDREN: THE AMERICAN FAMILY UNDER
PRESSURE 14 (1977) [hereinafter cited as KENISTON].
2. See Hafen, Does the Movement Towards Children's "Rights" Contain the
Seeds of Destruction for the Family?, 63 A.B.A.J. 1383, 1388 (1977). In Hafen,
Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Aban-
doning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 604, the author states: "[T]he
family unit does not simply co-exist vith our constitutional system; it is an integral
part of it. . . .The immensely important power of deciding about matters of early
socialization has been allocated to the family, not the government." Id. at 615-617. See
also Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977) citing the concurring opinion of
Justice Goldberg in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
3. Hafen, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 2, at 613.
4. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
ple." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), stated:
[It is] clear that the Framers did not intend that the first eight amend-
ments be construed to exhaust the basic and fundamental rights which
the Constitution guaranteed to the people. . . . The home derives it
preeminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that life is
something so fundamental that is has been found to draw to its protection
the principles of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right....
Id at 488-90.
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minimum education of children.' The primary role of instilling values
is reserved for parents. Parents retain the rights and duties to raise
and educate their children according to their own personal
philosophies and preferences. The sole limitation on the exercise of
this discretionary control is that it does not result in physical or
emotional harm to the child. Therefore the socialization of the young
rests with the parents who have chosen to delegate some of this
authority to schools and other state agencies while retaining wide
discretion and freedom of choice!
Abuse and neglect laws should be geared to keeping the family
together with minimum outside influences until the child is able to
function independently.' Except in clear cases of serious harm to the
child under clearly defined standards and procedure,8 constitutional
and case law authorities reflect the values placed on protecting the
family from state intervention. In order to preserve the family,
there is a need to build upon these authorities and to more carefully
tailor abuse and neglect laws. Current abuse and neglect laws facili-
tate the destruction of families rather than promote family integrity.
There are a number of basic principles which should be followed
to achieve the necessary protection of the family. First, the least in-
trusive means should be employed. No child should be removed from
his or her home unless there is a clear showing that the child is ex-
periencing or is in imminent danger of serious physical,
psychological, or emotional harm. Unless the delay caused by the im-
position of due process requirement will result in irreparable harm,
the child should not be removed without a prior evidentiary hearing.
Secondly, there must be a strong presumption in favor of the
nuclear family first and secondly in favor of the extended family.
Before the child is removed, the court must find that the replace-
ment home or institution will be less damaging to the child's
physical and emotional welfare than the conditions existing in the
nuclear or extended family. Finally, substantial efforts should be
made to rehabilitate the family. Courts must be committed to order-
ing intervening state agencies to provide services to keep the family
5. Hafen, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 2, at 658.
6. Id.
7. See generally FAMILY POLICY (A. Kahn & S. Kamerman eds. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as KAHN & KAMERMAN]; KENISTON, supra note 1; C. LASCH, HAVEN IN
A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESEIGED (1977) [hereinafter cited as LASCH].
8. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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intact. In short, rehabilitation should be the guiding principle at
every successive step of intrusion, until all reasonable efforts have
been expended.
There are a number of critical phases in the intervention pro-
cess which have substantial impact on the family. These include in-
vestigation, removal and placement, voluntary removal and other
consented intervention, maintenance of family contact and visitation,
family rehabilitative services, and termination procedures and stan-
dards. There is need to make further study and inquiry into these
steps to determine their significance and to then develop the
necessary legal framework to facilitate the achievement of the
recommended objectives.
Physically and emotionally healthy families are vital to stable,
caring, happy human relationships, and to our society's overall
strength and well-being. This proposition, well articulated and well
supported elsewhere," will be only briefly supported in this article.
This article is designed primarily to examine the interplay between
the family and child abuse and neglect laws. One goal of this article
is to assist in redirecting the thrust of our efforts to more fully
achieve the preservation and strengthening of the family."0 A strong
9. See, e.g., KAHN & KAMERMAN, supra note 7, at 14; J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD
& A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 13 (1973) [hereinafter referred
to as GOLDSTEIN]; KENISTON, supra note 1, at xiv; LASCH, supra note 7, at 4.
10. The development of improved legal responses to a given social problem,
already treated by statute and case law, entails two processes. First, the purposes of
the existing law, stated as well as implicit, must be ascertained. Second, statutory and
judicial standards and procedures must be initiated to more nearly fulfil desired basic
purposes and ultimate goals. In this fashion, more appropriate legal responses are
developed to solve the problem.
A beginning point of this article is the recognition that abuse and neglect laws
are an integral part of the entire body of law referred to as family law. One underlying
purpose of all law relating to families is to provide the legal means to met their needs
and to legalize their desires in such matters as marriage, dissolution of marriage,
custody and support. In these instances, the state, through its administrative and
judicial systems, is called upon to legally sanction or arbitrate matters submitted to it
by the family and its members. On the other hand, in the abuse and neglect area the
state is both one initiator of action to protect children and the decisionmaker. The
state, as initiator, urges the state, as decisionmaker, to do what it believes best for the
children. Thus, when the state intervenes, it suggests that the fundamental purpose of
abuse and neglect legislation is to protect children and outweighs any purpose to
preserve family autonomy. Implicit in the state's pursuit of this purpose is the notion
that the state decides what is best for the family and removes from it the discretion to
seek its own levels and meaning of family relationships. However, in pursuing its goal
to protect children from abuse and neglect, the state may be unnecessarily foregoing
the value and strength of family autonomy.
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argument will be made for a legal framework which views abuse and
neglect in the broader sense of a family problem requiring family
solutions. A further contention is that the sole or primary focus of
abuse and neglect laws in protecting children is currently being ac-
complished at the cost of fragmenting, impairing and possibly
destroying the family whose intimacy and integrity is so highly
valued and needed.
In urging the importance of the family it is readily acknowledged
at the outset that while most families aspire to provide a caring, loving
and nurturing environment for their members, all families ex-
perience occasional episodes of conflict, crisis, pain and demoraliza-
tion. Family life experts view most of these episodic experiences not
as bad or abnormal, but as a common, natural and necessary part of
the family living process." One of the unique qualities of family life
A major contention of this article is that the family unit is so important that
people living together as a family should be allowed to freely solve their problems in
their existing environment, if that is their desire. This suggests that child abuse or
neglect must be treated as a family problem, requiring family solutions, rather than as
a narrower problem involving only the protection of children. It must be recognized,
that the most basic underlying purpose of all abuse and neglect legislation should be
the protection of children through preservation of the family. Unnecessary removal of
a child from the home may substantially increase ultimate termination of the parent-
child relationship. This result may ultimately be more harmful to all the members of
the family, including the child, than the abuse or neglect which prompted the removal.
See Comment, The State vs. The Family: Does Intervention Really Spare the Child?,
28 MERCER L. REV. 547 (1977).
This argument supporting preservation of the family unit is guided by three in-
terrelated principles. First, intervention into the family should be limited only to those
situations when it becomes necessary to protect the child from serious harm. When
there is doubt as to the harm, or when the suspected harm results from that which is
in the broad range of acceptable child-rearing practices, intervention should not take
place. Secondly, when intervention become necessary, interference should take place in
the least intrusive fashion, only to the extent necessary to protect the child. Finally,
the state's right to intervene implicitly carries with it the dury to permit the family to
remain together subject only to the restriction that the serious harm which the child
was experiencing ceases.
This goal of family preservation is entirely consistent with the avowed purpose
of most abuse and neglect legislation. For example, Section 31-5-7-1 of the old Indiana
Juvenile Code stated: "the purpose of this act is to secure for each child within its pro-
visions such care, guidance and control, preferably in his own home, as will serve the
child's welfare and the best interest of the state; . . ." (emphasis supplied.) Similarly,
the new Indiana Juvenile Code, IND. CODE § 31-6-1-1 (Supp. 1979), states one of its pur-
poses is "to strengthen family life by assisting parents to fulfill their parental obiga-
tions;. . . "
11. In the book, MARITAL LOVE AND HATE, the author stated:
It should be a goal ... of one's personal and family emotional life, to ex-
pect and accept . . . pain and conflict and injustice and betrayal as the
1979]
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is an open environment where family members can resolve personal
and interpersonal conflicts. If this environment is important to us as
a society, we ought to prevent unnecessary government interven-
tion.
Unfortunately some parents actively or neglectfully hurt their
children. In order to protect their lives, sometimes society must'
coercively intervene. The primary issue then becomes at what point
and to what degree should intervention take place.' If family
integrity is to be maintained the standards and procedures for in-
tervention must be clearly defined. Intervention should be permit-
ted only in those cases involving actual or potential serious harm to
the child. As a result intervention will alleviate rather than exacer-
bate the harm.
Beginning with an exploration of the importance of the family,
this article argues for the further development and expansion of the
fundamental constitutional right to family integrity. The nature and
extent of the problem of child abuse and neglect is indicated and the
public and private efforts being made to deal with the problem will
be reviewed. Next, an attempt will be made to define the interests
and rights of the family, the parents, the children and the state. The
crucial aspects of coercive state intervention, such as investigation
into the family and removal of children, will be discussed in light of
the recent cases. Finally, through an analysis of the abuse and
stuff of life from which grow joy and becoming and love and family
wholesomeness, though always in cyclical, complexly interweaving pro-
cesses of growth and decay, life and death.
I. CHARNY, MARITAL LOVE AND HATE 305 (1972). In the Mid-Town Metropolis study
reported by Charny. and conducted in Manhattan, it was found that eighty to ninety
percent or more of the population was suffering from symptoms indicative of emotional
disturbance. Charny concluded:
[It is] a compelling truth, but one that the mental-health field has been
hard-pressed to deal with as long as the sick-healthy distinction remains
the key working concept of diagnosis rather than concepts of personal and
collective evolution. When we ask how far man has come along in his
potential for mental health and family fun, we are much freer to be
honest about the terrible agonies of most families than if we have to end
up saying everyone is sick, sick.
Id
12. In deciding when and how much to intervene, it is extremely important to
recognize that all normal families at times experience episodes of crisis. KENISTON,
supra note 1, at 186. Intervention at all moments of crisis would possibly be to their
permanent detriment. Intervention at the point of each crisis would deprive every
family the satisfying and strengthening experience of autonomously solving family prob-
lems. Furthermore, not enough is known about healthy or unhealthy family conflict to
permit the state to impose its value judgments on a family except in extreme cases.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 [1979], Art. 5
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neglect provisions of the new Indiana Juvenile Code, effective Oc-
tober 1, 1979, a statutory framework will be suggested which will
protect the child and the family from unnecessary coercive interven-
tion while adequately protecting children. The only justification for
intervention arises from a finding of serious harm that violates
clearly defined standards. This article argues specifically that any
framework must be built around the concept that coercive interven-
tion should be limited to protecting children from clearly defined
serious harms, actual or imminent, under precise and fair pro-
cedures.
FAMILY INTEGRITY
The family is the most important and fundamental social in-
stitution.18 It not only provides a nurturing and protective environ-
ment during a child's emotional and physical development," it also
furnishes the primary source for moral socialization.1 5 The family of-
13. KAHN & KAMERMAN, supra note 7, at 429-503; KENISTON, supra note 1, at
8-9.
14. Wald, Making Sense Out of the Rights of Youth, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 13
(1974).
15. LASCH, supra note 7, at iv.
In this respect, the importance religious authorities give to families should not
be ignored. Both the Old and New Testament scriptures place a high value on the
family. The Psalmist says in Psalm 68: 6 that "God sets the solitary in families." In
Ephesians, St. Paul depicts the family from the noble perspective that the family is a
gift from God, deserving of our loving care and deepest possible committment: "For
this reason I bow my knees before the Father, from whom every family in heaven and
on earth is named .... " Ephesians 3: 14-15. In the Social Principles of the United
Methodist Church, one denomination's position on the family is made clear:
"II. The Nurturing Community
The communiy provides the potential for nurturing human beings into the
fullness of their humanity...
A. The family. We believe the family to be the basic human community
through which persons are nurtured and sustained in mutual love, respon-
sibility, respect, and fidelity. We understand the family as encompassing
a wider range of options than that of the two-generational unit of parents
and children (the nuclear family), including the extended family, families
with adopted children .... we urge social, economic, and religious efforts
to maintain and strengthen families in order that every member may be
assisted toward complete personhood."
A statement in the Christian Family Standard, in use since 1951, indicates the position
of the Luthern Church, Missouri Synod:
We also acknowledge children as precious gifts of God and regard them
as a sacred trust. We pledge ourselves to live together as a family in a
manner pleasing to our heavenly Father. We acknowledge the God-
established family as providing the ideal environment in which man and
woman and their children can best supply one another's needs and find
their fullest development and their highest happiness.
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fers an open and intimate environment for working out conflicts be-
tween love and duty, and reason and passion,16 thereby serving as a
microcosm for the development of socially satisfying and productive
human relationships. 7 Due to its fundamentality as a social unit, the
family must be protected from governmental intervention in all but
the most compelling of circumstances. Often the best interests of
the child seem to dictate governmental intrusion'8 since a child is ill-
equipped to protect itself from abuse and neglect. On the other
hand, every family has a basic right to an opportunity to provide
adequate care for its children without governmental intervention."8
However, the best interests of an abused and neglected child and
the right to family privacy are not necessarily inconsistent values.
The child's interest should be the paramount consideration only
after a fair determination of justification for intrusion into the family
relationship. Even then the best interests of the child often mandate
strong efforts to fulfill the needs of the child within the family unit.
After balancing the best interests of the child against the right to
family integrity, only clear cases of delinquency, abuse, or neglect
will warrant governmental intrusion."
The Constitutional Right to Family Integrity
Family integrity means simply a wholeness or completeness of
the family in an unbroken condition; living together as a family."
Although no court has defined the term, courts have begun to use it
in cases involving the protection of families and individuals from ar-
bitrary coercive state intervention.2 Courts now appear to be at the
threshold of a fully developed constitutional right to family integrity.
Recognition of this right would guarantee free exercise of family living
with all its benefits while still allowing for the protection of
children." It is impossible to express all of the nuances of this right.
16. LASCH, supra note 7, at iv.
17. Id
18. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 7.
19. 1I at 8.
20. Id. at 105-06.
21. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961), defines integrity
as "an unimpaired or unmarred condition ... the quality of state of being complete or
undivided: material, spiritual, or aesthetic wholeness: organic unity." Id at 1174.
22. See, e.g., White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979); Alsager v.
District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
23. David L. Slader, Chief Attorney of the Child Advocacy Project of the
Metropolitan Public Offender, Portland, Oregon, has perceptively and succinctly ar-
ticulated the constitutional issue involved in protecting the family. In his address to
the Second National Conference on Child Abuse and Neglect in 1977, he stated:
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 [1979], Art. 5
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Perhaps its constitutional breadth can best be expressed in terms of
a prohibition against the government rather than in the form of a
Apart from encompassing the family within the concepts of "liberty" and
"privacy"-a process which is more one of definition than analysis-the
Supreme Court has, curiously, never explored the fundamental constitu-
tional rationale for the family's protected status. They have treated it, in-
deed, as if the constitutional foundation for the right was too self-evident
to be discussed.
The principles may be elusive precisely because they are so basic.
More fundamental even than the liberties of the Bill of Rights is the con-
cept pervading the Constitution that the government it creates-and, in-
deed, any government consistent with its principles-be one of limited
powers. The family, as an institution, is essential in maintaining that
system.
The two most important institutions which affect our behavior and
influence our lives are the family and the state. If you weaken one, you
strengthen the other. Any system of laws which has as its touchstone a
curb on the powers of the state must rely for its survival upon the
strength of some countervailing force. The family, if only for the reason
that it fills what would otherwise be an enormous power vacuum, is that
force.
Where the family dissolves or functions below a socially acceptable
level, the state inevitably intervenes. The state will, thus, take in the
abandoned child, rescue the neglected and abused one, coerce compliance
with the duty of parents and to cooperate with each other, and direct in
the most minute detail parental behavior of divorced spouses. If the family
were to dissipate as an institution or its vitality sapped, the state would
inevitably sense the vacuum and inexorably fill the void. It would by that
one stroke, cease to be a government of limited powers.
The unspecified rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amend-
ment and those guaranteed by the concept "liberty" include the family
because constitutional government cannot function without it. That princi-
ple is a silent premise in any child protection proceeding and serves as an
inflexible limitation on any postulated "rights of children" which rely for
their efficacy upon sovereign intervention. The question is, thus, not just,
"Is this in the child's best interest?" but also "Do we want the state to
have this power?"
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: ISSUES ON INNOVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT. UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE 374-75 (1977).
In light of this statement, there should be concern about the growing exercise of
power by various levels of government over the family. For example, both the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and the Child Welfare Services
program are subject to regulations which contain mechanisms for substantial instru-
sions into the home. Families are required to submit to regular recertification of
eligibility based upon observations and reports submitted by caseworkers. These
observations may be used against the family in abuse and neglect proceedings in which
either supervision or removal of the children are sought. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976), and
the regulations promulgated thereunder, 45 C.F.R. § 2201 (1978). See also 42 U.S.C. §
5101 (1976), and 45 C.F.R. § 231 (1978), for the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act and its governing regulations.
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complete enumeration of rights. Thus, in the context of abuse and
neglect, the government should not intervene in the family except in
cases involving serious harm to a child; and then only in the manner
least intrusive to family integrity.
Contemporary society recognizes the important benefits of
family living which may be sacrificed only in cases of serious proven
harm to the child." The reasons for honoring family integrity in-
clude an appreciation of personal autonomy and family autonomy. A
corollary to the value of family autonomy is the appreciation of
cultural diversity and recognition that, despite varying social,
economic or ethnic backgrounds, all families have equal rights to the
enjoyment of their heritage. Moreover a child's home environment is
not predictive of the child's later achievements. Children remain
psychologically attached to their parents and need to retain family
ties long after separation and removal. From a pragmatic stand-
point, government intervention tends to create dependence on
government for assistance while lessening intervention facilitates
strengthening of family self reliance. Finally, when interference is
not governed by clear standards, the free exercise of family rights is
threatened and everyone is the worse for it.
Abuse and Neglect: Background
Although intervention on behalf of children in abuse and
neglect cases is less than 100 years old, all states currently have
statutory intervention procedures.' The degree of intervention
24. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION TASK FORCE REPORT 337-42
(1976) [hereinafter referred to as JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION
REPORT].
25. All states have enacted juvenile statutes whereby the state may in-
tervene into the family relationship, usually on a county level, in matters concerning
dependency and child abuse and neglect. See Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect
Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1975). A close examination of these statutes indicates
a consistent use of broad and vague terminology. In many states a finding of "inade-
quate" or "unfit" parents is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court to order in-
tervention. KENISTON, supra note 1, at 187.
Similarly, since 1967 all states have enacted some form of legislation requiring
the report of any child abuse. See V. DEFRANCIS, CHILD ABUSE LEGISLATION IN THE
1970's (1970). Under the typical reporting act, physicians, teachers, and other persons
are required to report suspected child abuse to the county welfare department or
other designated agency. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-6-11-3 (Supp. 1979).
Finally, every state now has some statutory provision permitting voluntary ter-
mination of parental rights, either under its adoption statute of juvenile statute. See
Note, Legislative and Judicial Recognition of the Distinction Between Custody and
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varies from unobtrusive informal inquiries or investigations to
measures as drastic as involuntary termination of the parent-child
relationship.
Typically, a local welfare department petitions the court on
behalf of the state seeking legal custody of the child. This custody,
known as wardship, permits the agency to remove the child from
the home and to place the child in institutional or foster care. In
almost every instance, the purpose of removal is avowedly to pro-
vide adequate temporary care for the child until the parents can
reassume their duties. Although the agency has legal custody during
this period, the parents retain guardianship rights." They, and not
the state, retain the authority to control the child's life in crucial
respects such as consent for surgery, marriage or enlistment in the
military.
Three competing interests have been identified and weighed in
abuse and neglect cases: the liberty and privacy interests of the
parents," the interest of the state in protecting children from harm
as parens patriae," and the interests of the child.9 Under the early
abuse and neglect statutes, the best interests of the child were para-
mount. This approach failed to protect adequately parents' rights by
neglecting to account for them. Recently courts have recognized
that parental rights are fundamental, thus offering more protection
from state intervention.
The interest of the child, on the other hand, has been nearly
unrecognized. In fact, until 1967, courts assumed children had no
legal rights." Even today, children are not legally entitled to
Termination Orders for Child Neglect Cases, 7 J. FAM. L. 66 (1967). Under these
statutes parental rights are completely severed and the right to regain custody per-
manently relinquished.
26. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 828 n.20 (1977).
27. Loosely described, parental rights include the right to care, custody, and
control of the child. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 4.
28. The state's interests are delicately balanced between protecting the child
and preserving the family. The state, through its police powers and role as parens
patriae, recognizes the necessity of protecting children due to their inability to protect
themselves from abuse and neglect. Areen, Intervention Between Parents and Chilk
A Reappraisal of the State's Role in the Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J.
887, 893 (1975). On the other hand, premature or unwarranted state intervention on
behalf of children destroys family strength. This not only weakens the social fabric, it
also creates an economic burden. Id at 892.
29. See J. RADBILL, A HISTORY OF CHILD ABUSE AND INFANTICIDE 3-21 (1974).
30. In the landmark decision, In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Supreme
Court summarized the prevailing assumption when it stated:
19791
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medical care or a nutritionally adequate diet,"' although recently the
Supreme Court has begun to recognize the interests of the child as
separately important.2 In addition a few state statutes now require
court appointed guardians ad litem in abuse and neglect pro-
ceedings," while some states also permit partial or complete eman-
cipation of some children found abused or neglected." Thus the
rights of children have only begun to be accorded a new significance
in our legal systems. As the law begins to recognize and develop the
right to family integrity, these separate interests compete less to
the detriment or exclusion of each other; rather the law emphasizes
honoring and preserving the family as its primary goal while the
separate interests are subordinated.
American child abuse and neglect laws are, however, in tension
with the parents' rights to raise their children according to personal
dictates.' The law sanctifies this right by granting parents legal
A child, unlike an adult, has a right "not to liberty, but to custody." If his
parents default in effectively performing their custodial functions-that
is, if the child is delinquent-the state may intervene. In doing so, it does
not deprive the child of any rights because he has none. It merely pro-
vides the "custody" to which the child is entitled.
Id. at 17.
31. Areen, supra note 28, at 895.
32. In In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court held that "neither the Four-
teenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." Id. at 13. In Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Justice Douglas recognized that: "While the parents, ab-
sent dissent, normally speak for the entire family, the education of the child is a mat-
ter on which the child will often have decided views." Id at 243-44 (cites omitted)
(Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
More recently the Court, in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976),
again recognized that minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess rights under it. Id. at 74. See also Cary v. Population Services International,
431 U.S. 678 (1977). Finally, in Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979), the Court upheld
the constitutionality of a Georgia statute permitting parents to commit their children
to the state mental hospital without first a hearing before an impartial tribunal. The
Court concluded that parents have a substantial, if not the dominant interest in the
decision absent abuse or neglect. Id at 2505. Without specifically defining the balance
of interests between parents and children in abuse and neglect cases, the Court in-
dicated that the interest of the parent would be less than that of the child. This case is
perhaps more significant for the reason that the Court again cautioned the state to
abstain from interference into matters involving family choices.
These cases indicate a distinct, though unclearly defined, recognition children's
rights separate from parents and from the state. There is indeed a need for more
carefully defined standards in the area of children's rights in order to preserve family
integrity and the free exercise of family living. See N. WEINSTEIN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN (1973).
33. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-6-3-4 (Supp. 1979).
34. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-6-4-16(e)(5) (Supp. 1979).
35. See Katz, Ambrosino, McGrath & Sawirtsky, Legal Research on Child
Abuse and Neglectk Past and Future, 11 FAM. L.J. 151 (1977).
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custody of their children and by supporting them with the legal
presumption that parental love and concern provides adequate care
and protection for the child." Despite the lack of specific constitu-
tional authority, the United States Supreme Court recognized and
upheld the parents' right to determine their children's upbringing
on various constitutional grounds. 7 Constitutional bases also
justified state court decisions upholding parental control of their
children." Thus the underlying principle of abuse and neglect laws is
that the state should not disturb parental choices so long as parents
provide an adequate home, medical care and education."
Legal Recognition of the Value of Family Integrity
Only recently the Supreme Court has begun to recognize what
sociologists and psychologists have accepted for decades. In Moore
v. East Cleveland'" the court first noted the roots of the family in
this country's history and tradition. It added that "[ilt is through the
family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values ..... " The same year, in Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families," the Court observed that the importance of families
"stems from the emotional attachment that derives from the in-
timacy of daily associations, and from the role [they play] in
promot[ing] a way of life through the instruction of children. " '" Re-
cent court decisions, then, establish constitutional protection for the
sanctity of the family."
36. The state should not disturb the parents' personal choices in raising their
children so long as the parent provides an adequate home, maintains the children's
health, and provides eduction. Dobson, The Juvenile Court and Parental Rights, 4
FAM. L.Q. 393, 396 (1970).
37. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645.
651 (1972); Ginsberg v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring);
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533
(1953); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see sources cited
in note 9 supra.
38. See, e.g., Pima County v. Howard, 112 Ariz. 170, 540 P.2d 642 (1975); Reist v.
Bay County Circuit Judge, 396 Mich. 326, 241 N.W.2d 55 (1976). See also J. GOLDSTEIN
& J. KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW 399-408 (1965).
39. W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 159
(6th ed. 1976).
40. 431 U.S. 494 (1976).
41. Id. at 503-04.
42. 431 U.S. 816 (1976).
43. Id. at 845-46. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in which
the Court discusses the strong position of the family in Western civilization.
44. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 503. For a discussion of the
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A corrollary to the sanctity of the family recognized by the
Supreme Court is the right to family integrity, also described as
"the right to live together as a family.""' The concept of family in-
tegrity was first articulated in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in
Poe v. Ullman." Harlan noted that the home derives its preeminence
as the seat of family life. He then added: "The integrity of that life
is something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its
protection from the principles of more than one explicitly granted
constitutional right."'7 Eventually the majority of the Court adopted
Harlan's concept of family integrity.'8
Other federal and state tribunals echo the language of the
Supreme Court in specifying the rights of the family. For example,
in Alsager v. District Court,"' the court concluded there is a fun-
damental right to family integrity protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.' The Oklahoma
Supreme Court recently recognized the fundamentality of family in-
tegrity which it found emanated from both the Fourteenth and the
Ninth Amendments."' At the core of the right to family integrity,
then, are the Fourteenth Amendment liberty and privacy interests
articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut.5 2
The Supreme Court's recent recognition of the protection of
certain relationships is crucial to a fuller development of the fun-
damental right to family integrity. In Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton," for example, the Court, in dicta, concluded that constitu-
evolution of the sanctity of the family, see Boykin, Origins of the Substantive Right of
Family Autonomy, 30 MERCER L. REv. 719 (1979).
45. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977).
46. 467 U.S. 497 (1961).
47. Id. at 551-52.
48. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
49. 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975). affd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
50. Id at 16. See also Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 777 (M.D. Ala. 1976). In
Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1191 (S.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd on
other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2371 (1979), the court stated: "It is now clear that there is a
fundamental right emanating from the Constitution, which protects the family unit .. "
51. Matter of Sherol A.S., 581 P.2d 884, 888 (Okla. 1978). In Fitzgerald v.
Porter Memorial Hospital, 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976), the
court ruled against the plaintiffs who had sought to be in the delivery room during the
birth of their children. Despite this adverse ruling, the court nevertheless recognized
the protected interest in family integrity.
52. 381 U.S. 479, (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
53. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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tionally protected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procrea-
tion and child-rearing involves protected intimate relationships."
Perhaps the most basic of all relationships, that of parent and
child, has recently been subjected to close judicial scrutiny.5 In
Duschesne v. Sugarman,w the Second Circuit held that the preserva-
tion of family integrity encompasses the reciprocal rights of both
parent and child in relationship to each other." The court defined
the interest of the parent as the right to the companionship, care,
custody and management of his or her children. The interest of
children was defined as the right to maintain the emotional at-
tachments deriving from the intimacy of daily association with the
parent." Thus the court attempted to deal with the complexity of
the parent-child relationship.
Three important considerations form the basis for recognizing
and protecting family relationships when dealing with abuse and
neglect. First and foremost, abuse and neglect practices, the most
common occurence of state intervention, must be undertaken with
the goal of preserving family bonds steadfastly in mind. From the
premise that parent-child relationships are delicate, intimate and
highly valued, flows the conclusion that intervention should occur
only when absolutely necessary. This conclusion is reinforced by the
fact that determining what constitutes real harm to the child and
predicting what impact it will have on the child's adult life is dif-
ficult, if not impossible. This knowledge should serve to curb in-
tervention except in cases of serious harm. Even when the threat to
the child justifies intervention, the state must honor the relation-
ships as fully as possible in order to preserve and restore them. In
practice this requires the state to use the least intrusive means and
to place primary emphasis on rehabilitative services. Intervention
must not occur at the expense of family relationships, and thereby
perhaps also at the expense of the children, but as a means of
preserving the family whenever possible. Secondly, because the
family is composed of a number of protected relationships, each of
those relationships deserves the same protections as are afforded
the family as a unit. Finally, it must not be forgotten that children,
54. Id at 66 n.13. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court
spoke of "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamen-
tal constitutional guarantees." Id at 485 (emphasis supplied).
55. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 777 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
56. 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977).
57. Id at 825.
58. Id
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as integral parts of family relationships, are entitled to the same
rights and protections derivatively gained from the family and family
associations.
CURRENT ABUSE AND NEGLECT PRACTICES:
AN EROSION OF FAMILY INTEGRITY
In recent years the actual and estimated incidence of abuse and
neglect has greatly increased. This rise is due in large part to
heightened public awareness of the problem brought about through
mass media coverage. As a result, child care and public assistance
personnel have focused their attention on the detection and preven-
tion of child abuse and neglect.59
Approximately 150,000 child abuse and neglect proceedings are
heard each year by the various juvenile courts throughout the
United States." Estimates vary widely as to the actual incidence of
child abuse and neglect. Some authorities indicate that 665,000 to
1,675,000 children are physically abused, sexually molested, or
seriously neglected by their parents each year." Each year more
than 10,000 children are severely battered; at least 50,000 to 75,000
are sexually abused; 100,000 suffer physical, moral or educational
neglect; and another 100,000 are emotionally neglected.2 Neglect is
59. For example, caseworkers are required by law to make periodic home
visits to families on public assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 2201 (1978).
These visitations place the caseworkers in a practical position to observe cases of
abuse and neglect.
60. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 1973 12-13 (1975). Poor people are subjected to abuse and
neglect proceedings at a higher rate than their percentage of the general population.
Estimates indicate that probably seventy-five percent of neglected families seen by
agencies have income below the poverty level and half may be on welfare. See Wald,
State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children. A Search for Realistic Stan-
dards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1021 n.186 (1975). See also Handler & Rosenheim, Privacy
in Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile Justice, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 377 (1966);
Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts and the Poor Man, 54 CAL. L. REV. 694 (1966).
A 1964 study conducted in Minnesota indicates that even though only three per-
cent of the families in the general population were receiving public assistance, forty-
two percent of the families reported to be neglecting their children were receiving
public aid. Boehm, The Community and the Society Agency Define Neglect, 1964
CHILD WELFARE 453, 459. Some authorities have concluded that our child welfare laws
even foster discrimination against the poor. See, e.g., tenBroek, California's Dual
System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, (pts. 1-3), 16
STAN. L. REV. 257, 900 (1964), 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965).
61. Light, Abused and Neglected Children in America: A Study of Alter-
native Policies, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 556, 567 (1975).
62. V. FONTANNA, SOMEWHERE A CHILD IS CRYING: MALTREATMENT -CAUSES
AND PREVENTION 38 (1976).
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estimated to be 21/2 to 20 times higher than abuse, with estimates
ranging between 500,000 and 2,000,000 incidents a year.' Still
another source estimates that from 2,000 to 5,000 children die each
year as a result of child abuse." This disparity in estimates of abuse
and neglect incidence stems in part from disagreement as to what
constitutes abuse and neglect;"5 a disagreement that is reflected in
the variety of statutory standards among the states."
Although statutory standards vary, the laws consistently rely
on two tests: the "inadequate parent" standard and the "best in-
terests of the child" standard. Both tests fail to adequately account
for the right to family integrity. Reliance on these tests results in
63. LEVIN, CHILD NEGLECT: REACHING THE PARENT 26 (1973).
64. Kempe, Approaches to Preventing Child Abuse, 130 AM. J. DIS. CHIL. 941,
945 (1976).
65. Areen, supra note 28, at 887 nn.5 & 6.
66. Various state juvenile codes make reference to delinquency, dependency,
neglect and abuse. For example, under IND. CODE § 31-5-7-5 (repealed 1979), the old
code provision, a dependent child was defined as: "any boy under the age of eighteen
[18] years or any girl under the age of eighteen [18] years, who is dependent upon the
public for support, or who is destitute, homeless, or abandoned."
The old code also defined a neglected child as:
Any boy under the age of eighteen [18] years or any girl under the age of
eighteen [18] years who:
(1) Has not proper parental care of guardianship;
(2) Is destitute, homeless or or abandoned;
(3) Habitually begs or receives alms;
(4) By reason of neglect, cruelty or disrepute on the part of parents, guar-
dians or other persons in whose care the child may be living in an im-
proper place;
(5) Is in an environment dangerous to life, limb or injurious to the health
or morals of himself or others.
IND. CODE § 31-5-7-6 (repealed 1979). The new code, IND. CODE § 31-6-4-3 (Supp. 1979),
contains a typical definition of an abused child as one whose "physical or mental health
is seriously endangered due to injury by the act or omission of his parent, guardian, or
custodian; .. " Generally, dependency means that the parents, through no fault of
their own, become unable to care for their child. Neglect and abuse, on the other hand,
do involve parental fault. Abuse is generally confined to willful injuries to the child
while neglect is the result of unintentional inadequate parental care. CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: THE PROBLEMS AND ITS MANAGEMENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH.
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 2-3 (1977). This definitional distinction between abuse and
neglect is often based on who reports the case rather than what happens to the child.
Id. This traditional terminology, however, is being abandoned in favor of such terms as
"endangered child," and "Child in Need of Services" (CHINS). See INSTITUTE OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION/AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE
AND NEGLECT 3 (1978); JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION REPORT, supra
note 30, at 334. Compare IND. CODE § 31-5-7-4, -5, -6 (repealed 1979) with IND. CODE §
31-6-4-3 (Supp. 1979).
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state intervention in the family without an adequate state interest,
thereby destroying family integrity.
Most statutes permit courts to act in the "best interests of the
child." 7 However, none of the statutes specify at what point courts
must apply this test. Consequently the test has become a general
standard for determining whether a child is abused or neglected
rather than a dispositional standard to be applied once abuse or
neglect is found. The improper application of this test results in a
serious erosion of family integrity.
The standard is also impossible to apply because of its inherent
vagueness. This vagueness permits judges to import into their deci-
sions personal and typically middle-class biases. Judges, motivated by
the worthy goal of giving children the best chances of success in life,
often leap to conclude that children would be better off in another
placement before any determination is made that the child is truly
abused or neglected. These highly subjective judgments of what con-
stitutes bad parenting allow children to be separated from their
families or allow the family to be otherwise monitored by the state
regardless of actual objective harm. Justice Stewart, concurring in
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families," condemned the "best in-
terests" test by explaining:
If a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a
natural family, over the objections of the parents and
their children, without some showing of unfitness and for
the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the
children's best interest, I should have little doubt that the
State would have intruded impermissibly on "the private
realm of family life which the State cannot enter."69
Similarly, the Indiana Court 9 f Appeals has also expressed
dissatisfaction with the "best interests" test:
67. See Katz, Howe and McGrath, supra note 25. See also Areen, supra note
28, at 888 n.5. The new Indiana Code provision, IND. CODE § 31-6-4-16 (Supp. 1979), re-
quires the court to enter a decree consistent with the welfare of the child and place-
ment "in the best interests of the child." This test was borrowed from divorce law.
Clearly the circumstances involved in a divorce differ from those in an abuse and
neglect proceeding. In a divorce, the state acts as an arbiter between parents with
equal rights to a child and in roughly equal bargaining positions. On the other hand, in
abuse and neglect proceedings, the parents have not voluntarily submitted themselves
to the court's jurisdiction for a custody determination and the state participates both
as an arbiter and a party.
68. 431 U.S. 816 (1976).
69. Id. at 862, cited with approval in Quilloin v. Walcot, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978), and in Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 827 (2d Cir. 1977).
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If the best interest [of the child] rule was the only stan-
dard needed without anything else, to deprive the natural
parent of custody of his own child, then what is to keep
the government or third parties from passing judgment
with little, if any, care for the rights of natural parents. In
other words, a child might be taken away from the
natural parent and given to a third party simply by show-
ing that a third party could provide the better things in
life for the child and therefore the 'best interest' of the
child would be satisfied by being placed with a third
party.
0
Subjective judgments on the best interest of the child thus fail
because not enough is known about the relative impact of a deficient
home and also because such judgments intrude on the private realm
of family life.
In order to remedy the abuses of the "best interests" test, the
Juvenile Justice Standards Project proposed a two step process.
The court should first ascertain whether the child is in fact being
abused or neglected.' Secondly, the court must apply the best in-
terests of the child test to determine whether intervention and
removal is required or if the child can be protected by some other
means from the harm used to justify intervention.7 2 Thus, the court
would be forced to consider if home-based services or alternatives
would reasonably ensure the protection of the child. This two step
approach more adequately accounts for the family's right to live
together.
70. Hendrickson v. Bailey, 161 Ind. App. 217, 224, 316 N.E.2d 376, 381, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1974). See also Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979). In
Caban, the Court rejected a New York statute which on the theory of the best in-
terests of the child allowed the adoption of a child against its unwed father's wishes.
The Court held that there must be a finding of abandonment or other legal basis for
permitting adoption. See also Hyatt v. Lopez, __ Ind. App. - , 366 N.E.2d 676
(1977); Stevenson v. Stevenson, __ Ind. App. , 364 N.E.2d 161 (1976). See
generally Wald, supra note 60.
71. See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children" Stan-
dards of Removal of Children From Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children
in Foster Homes, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 625, 627, 662
(1976).
72. In State v. McMaster, 259 Ore. 291, 486 P.2d 567 (1971), the Oregon
Supreme Court refused to terminate the parent-child relationship on the basis of the
family's poverty, housekeeping, or instability. The court used an equal protection
analysis and noted that perhaps the children would have a greater opportunity for
achievement in another environment but, in the absence of a substantial departure
from the norm, the state could take no action. See also In Re Rinker, 180 Pa. Super.
143, 117 A.2d 780 (1955).
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Closely related to the "best interests" test is the "inadequate
parent" standard, a term which also frequently occurs in abuse and
neglect statutes. Like "best interests," the term defies precise
definition, thereby allowing the judges and caseworkers the freedom
to inject personal, middle-class values into situations involving the
lower socio-economic stratum." While discretionary freedom is
essential, the vagueness of the "inadequate parent" standard invites
abuse.
At the root of the problem with this standard is the difficulty
of predicting adult achievement from observation of child-rearing
practices. A study recently summarized by Arlene Skolnick
demonstrated this fact.7" Psychologists followed 166 infants born in
the year 1929 for a thirty year period. The most startling finding
was the difficulty of predicting what thirty-year-old adults would be
like even after the most sophisticated data had been gathered on
them as children. Ms. Skolnick stated:
[T]he researchers experienced shock after shock as they
saw the people they had last seen at age 18. It turned out
that the predictions they had made about the subjects
were wrong in about 2/3s of the cases! How could a group
of competent psychologists have been so mistaken?
Foremost, the researchers tended to over-estimate
the damaging effects of early troubles of various kinds. In-
deed, many instances of what looked like severe pathology
to the researchers were put into constructive use by the
subjects.
The theoretical predictions of the researchers were
also jarred from the other direction by the adult status of
children who had seemed especially blessed by ability,
talent or personality, or ease and confidence .... 15
Courts, rather than heeding such studies, unfortunately often rely
on their own judgments in abuse and neglect cases.
In practice abuse of the standard is demonstrated by the crea-
tion of presumptions of inadequate parenting. Courts assume, with-
out specifically finding, that mental illness or alcoholism, for ex-
ample, prevent a parent from adequately caring for the child." In
73. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 226, 242, 248 (1975).
74. A. SKOLNICK, THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT: EXPLORING MARRIAGE IN THE
FAMILY (1973).
75. Id. at 372.
76. Wald, supra note 60, at 1021.
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other cases courts have terminated parental rights where the child
was present in the home with other illegitimate children or where
parents were guilty of writing bad checks. 77 Although parental con-
duct may harm a child, creation of an irrebuttable presumption or
even implicit assumptions of serious harm, absent actual proof,
deprives the family of the fundamental right to family integrity and
offends basic due process. In fact that which is apparently harmful
to the child may actually instill such positive values as responsibility,
self-reliance, industry, independence, and innovativeness.
Removal
Unless there is a clear emergency, removal of a child from the
home should occur only after abuse or neglect has been determined
at a proper adjudicatory hearing and less drastic alternatives have
been carefully considered and rejected. Physically splitting up the
family constitutes the most serious of all intervening actions. In
practice, however, removal tends to be one of the first protective
measures used by the state. Frequently, prior to any hearing, a
caseworker removes and places a child under foster care. This may
be accomplished either with a court order, issued on the word of the
caseworker that an emergency exists, or without such an order.
Thus the caseworker determines the primary issue of abuse and
neglect as well as the dispositional alternative. This, in turn, paves
the way for a court to ratify the removal and then to follow the ad-
ditional recommendations of the welfare department. Given the fact
that removal is so drastic and can be accomplished ex parte at the
early stages of a case, it should be carefully controlled to avoid
abuse and overuse.78
Statistics indicate the severity of the removal problem.
Children are removed from their natural or adoptive homes at an
annual rate in excess of 100,000. T1 Approximately 754,000 children
77. See, e.g., In Re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968); In Re Welfare of
Karren, 280 Minn. 377, 159 N.W.2d 402 (1968).
78. Despite its impact on the subject family, removal has many attractive
features. Removal is relatively easy to effect because the child can be quickly and
simply taken from the home by a coordinated effort of the court, the police, and the
welfare department. Removal is a potent, effective tool with a great deal of appeal to a
sensitive public because the affected child, secreted in foster care, is placed beyond the
control and influence of the abusive or neglectful parents. Removal is particularly ap-
pealing to the state and its understaffed agencies because it is much less time consum-
ing than other alternatives such a supervision in the natural home.
79. A study conducted in Los Angeles and San Francisco indicates that the
courts remove children in sixty to sixty-five percent of all cases in which they assume
jurisdiction. In San Francisco the average time spent in foster care is nearly five
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live under some form of foster care." The best available data in-
dicate that up to half of abuse and neglect proceedings result in
removal of the child from the natural parents' home. 1 Once removed,
there is a fifty percent likelihood that a removed child will remain in
foster care for three or more years.' Estimates vary but between
forty and eighty percent of all children presently removed from
their homes by court order will never be returned to their parents."
Proper removal takes place in four ways: it may occur without
court order under true emergency circumstances; or upon an
emergency court order may be obtained prior to a hearing; or after
a full adjudicatory hearing for the purpose of establishing tem-
porary wardship; or finally, removal may come after an adjudicatory
hearing held to terminate parental rights.
While little is known about what factors most influence child
development, one facet seems to rise above all others in importance:
the stability of relationships with parents and parent figures." Ex-
perts point out that children frequently experience pressure to
assimilate new and frightening demands and realities. Since children
lack internal controls and objectivity, internal assimilation is best
accomplished when a child has a relationship continuity with parent
figures."
Child development authorities suggest that any disruption of
this relationship severely harms the child. This is true partially
because the child conceives of time differently than adults who have
years. Sixty-two percent of the children placed in foster care remain there for their en-
tire childhood. Fifteen to twenty-five percent return home and less than fifteen per-
cent are ever adopted. See Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 559 (1973). See also KENISTON, supra note 1, at 188.
80. 44 Fed. Reg. 13,255 (1979).
81. Mnookin, supra note 79, at 606. See also INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL AD-
MINISTRATION/AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT
1 (1978).
82. Wald, supra note 71, at 627.
83. Id. at 662.
84. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 9-28.
85. Physical emotional, intellectual, social and moral growth does not
happen without causing one child inevitable internal difficulties. The in-
stability of all mental process during the period of development needs to
be offset by stability and uninterrupted support from external sources.
Smooth growth is arrested or disrupted when upheavals and changes in
the external world are added to the internal one. . . . Continuity of rela-
tionships, surroundings and environmental influences are essentials for a
child's normal development.
Id. at 31-32.
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learned to anticipate the future and thus manage delay. Removal
becomes an anxiety-ridden experience because children have an in-
nate sense of urgency for emotional ties and support. The child can-
not take care of himself physically and his emotional and intellectual
memory is too immature to enable effective use of his cognitive
powers to hold onto his parents after separation from them. Emo-
tionally and intellectually the infant cannot stretch his waiting more
than a few days without feeling overwhelmed by the absence of the
parent."
Removal has been described as the coarsest implement used by
the state on the family. Involuntary separation of the family is prob-
ably the most drastic disruption to family stability." It has been por-
trayed as a terrifying and painful experience which damages the
child's personality and normal growth." The impact of removal is
particularly traumatic for the child when it occurs precipitously and
without preparation, which is often the case. In fact caseworkers
and police officers often prefer surprise removal because the task is
much easier."
Parental trauma resulting from removal probably equals that
of the child. While many studies have examined the pathology of
abusive and neglectful parents," there is very little empirical data
regarding specific psychological effects of removal on parents. 1 The
parent may experience intense sorrow, pain, shame, fear and a
general sense of hopelessness." In addition labels of "child abuser"
86. Id. at 40-41.
87. KENISTON, supra note 1, at 185-92.
88. It is abnormal in our society for a child to be separated for any con-
tinuing length of time from his own parents and no one knows this so well
as the child himself. For him, placement is a shocking and bewildering
calamity, the reasons for which he usually does not understand.
Young, Placement from the Child's View, 31 SOCIAL CASE WORK 250 (1950). See also
Maluccio, Foster Family Care Revisited. Problems and Prospects, 31 PUB. WELFARE 58
(1973); Wiltse & Gambrill, Foster Care, 1973, A Reappraisal, 32 PUB. WELFARE 94
(1974). "[Sbo far as the child's emotions are concerned, interference with the tie,
whether to a 'fit' or 'unfit' psychological parent, is extremely painful." GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 9, at 20.
89. In the author's experience, almost every summary removal occurs without
any warning to the parent or child, affording no kind of meaningful preparation. In
many cases the child of cognitive age is not informed adequately even after removal.
90. See, e.g., CHILD NEGLECT: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE (1975).
91. Bricker, Summary Removal of Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases: The
Need for Due Process Protections, 2 FAM. L. REP. 4037, 4039 (1976).
92. S. JENKINS & F. NORMAN, FILIAL DEPRIVATION AND FOSTER CARE (1972).
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or "neglectful parent" stigmatize parents in our society." So long as
the welfare caseworker is working with the family in the privacy of
the home or the welfare office, the family problem is not open to
public review. Removal, however, raises suspicion, gossip and ques-
tions among friends, relatives and neighbors. The damage to parents
incurred as the result of the labelling experience is not easily over-
come.' Although the parent may be better equipped emotionally,
the pain and the trauma to the parent must be akin to that suffered
by the child. 5 Unexpected removal certainly deepens the trauma.
Such removal may cause some parents, particularly those without
many material goods, to feel as if they have been stripped of the
last thing of value in their lives.
Family development experts note a number of other harms
associated with removal and placement in foster care. The overall
harm to the child and family may exceed the damage the interven-
tion sought to avoid. Often there is little or no contact between the
parent and child following removal. The child feels cut off from the
parent upon whom he depends for physical and psychological needs.
The child may be shifted from placement to placement. The result of
all of this is that the child may feel responsible, punished, and
bewildered, particularly if the reasons for intervention are not made
clear."
Based upon these observations, clearly a child should not be
removed except as a last alternative in extreme cases.' Unfor-
tunately there are cases of abuse and cases of crisis situations of
neglect when a child must be removed from the home immediately.
Even in those instances, if the child can be adequately protected or
the crisis abated with the child remaining in the home, removal
93. Bricker, supra note 91, at 1039, citing E. GOFFMAN. STIGMA: NOTES ON THE
MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963) [hereinafter referred to as GOFFMAN], and R.
SCHWARTZ & J. SKOLNICK. Two STUDIES OF LEGAL STIGMA FOUND IN PERSPECTIVES ON DE-
VIANCE -THE OTHER SIDE (1964) [hereinafter referred to as SCHWARTZ & SKOLNICK].
94. Bricker, supra note 91, at 1039; GOFFMAN, supra note 93; SCHWARTZ &
SKOLNICK, supra note 93.
95. The effect on both parent and child of sudden and unplanned removal is
perhaps not unlike the nighttime arrests vividly described in A. SOLZHENITSIN, THE
GULAG ARCHIPELAGO (1974), where the author relates the experience as "a breaking
point in your life, a bolt of lightning which has scored a direct hit on you .... It is an
unassimiliable spiritual earthquake not every person can cope with, as a result of
which people often slip into insanity. ... Id. at 3.
96. See J. BOWLBY, CHILD CARE AND THE GROWTH OF LOVE 13-20 (1965); GOLDS-
TEIN, supra note 9. at 19-20.
97. Wald, supra note 60, at 991-1000; Wald, supra note 71, at 638.
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would not be warranted. Even when the child cannot be fully pro-
tected in the home, the question must become whether the child will
be harmed more by the removal than by staying in the home. In
answering this question, it must be recognized that, once separated,
the family is in danger of complete disintegration. This is due to the
lack of social services for rehabilitation and the overuse of foster
care." The system's failings can be traced in substantial part to the
unbridled discretion of the state and social agencies in dealing with
families that come to their attention. The agencies' exercise of this
discretion logically overlooks the importance of honoring family
integrity."
The consequences of removal reach far beyond the emotions of
the parent and child. The frequency and manner in which removal
takes place is one barometer of society's commitment to honor family
integrity. 100 The ease with which the courts permit removal is an in-
dication of how much they rely on the word of welfare caseworkers.
98. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 19-20.
A recent 18 month study of foster care revealed that while we spend in excess
of two billion dollars annually on foster care, there is little effort to reunite the family.
The study found that children are bounced from placement to placement with little ap-
parent justification other than expedience. The report concluded that money could bet-
ter be spent for rehabilitative services such as counseling, emergency caretakers and
crisis intervention services in order to keep families together. NATIONAL COMM'N ON
CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS. WHO KNOWS, WHO CARES? FORGOTTEN CHILDREN IN
FOSTER HOMES (1979).
99. Lowry, The Judge v. the Social Worker: Can Arbitrary Decision Making
be Tempered by the Courts?, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1977).
A typical consent to temporary wardship reads as follows:
CONSENT TO TEMPORARY WARDSHIP AND
WAIVER OF NOTICE OF HEARING
I the natural mother/father of a
minor child under the age of eighteen (18) years hereby consents to said
minor child being made a temporary ward of the
County Department of Public Welfare and waives notice upon any hear-
ing the purpose of which is to create a temporary wardship.
100. Wald, supra note 60, at 991-1000; Wald, supra note 71, at 638. Wald
argues forcefully against removal and in favor of family autonomy. He also criticizes
removal because little is known about child-rearing practices and adult predictability
and intervention itself may prove more harmful than not removing the child at all.
Finally, Wald does not draw the distinction between parental rights and children's
rights that some commentators urge. See, e.g. S. FIRESTONE. THE DIALECTIC OF SEX
99-118 (1971); Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343 (1972).
Wald's position is that by promoting autonomous families, both the interests of the
child and the parent are promoted. This is a recognition of the right to family integrity
and the family's right to be free from state intrusion except in those instances where
serious harm is done to the child.
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It is also a guage of how far the courts allow the welfare depart-
ments to proceed applying their own standards. Removal of the
child from the parent who has been the major provider of care has
so many disadvantages that some authorities contend summary
removal should be exercised only in those instances in which the
child's very survival is at stake.0 1
Removal, particularly on a summary and ex parte basis, places
the state in a powerful position to dictate to the parents the terms
and conditions surrounding the return of the child including such
things as seeking of counseling, gaining employment, obtaining dif-
ferent housing, and other terms.'" The state could impose none of
101. See expert testimony of Drs. Albert J. Solnit and Sally A. Provence in
Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976), where these eminent child develop-
ment experts concluded:
1. Summary removal of a young child from a parent who has been his
major caregiver is a severe threat to his development. It disrupts and
grossly endangers what he most needs, that is, the continuity of affec-
tionate care from those to whom he is attached through bonds of love.
2. Summary removal should be allowed only under conditions in which
physical survival is at stake.
102. Two recent cases, one involving alleged abuse and the other neglect, in
which the Valparaiso University Law School clinical program interns represented the
natural mothers, illustrate the power the state can wield in the removal process.
Moreover, these cases point the need for clearly defined and observed standards.
In the first case an eighteen-year-old natural mother of a two-month-old child
was in the process of moving from her parents' home to her maternal grandmother's
home. A dispute arose between the woman and her father and the police was called to
assist her in vacating her parents' premises. Upon arrival, the police resolved the con-
flict by advising her to entrust the child to her mother and to leave the premises.
Thereafter the police notified the welfare department and, armed with an ex parte
emergency order from the juvenile court, the department placed the child in a foster
home. At the hearing to dissolve the emergency order, the court held as a matter of
law that the type of emergency comtemplated by the dependent and neglected child
statute existed and that a later evidentiary hearing to determine the existence of a
true emergency in this case should be held. Ultimately, through negotiation and a
home study to determine fitness of the grandmother's home, the child was returned to
the natural mother within two weeks of the removal.
Two points are noteworthy about this case. First, even though both the police
and the welfare department admitted that the only reasons for removal of the child
were the threats made by the grandfather against the mother, neither saw fit to simply
escort the mother and her child out of the house. Secondly, the court found as a matter
of law that the child was dependent or neglected thereby creating an emergency
juvenile matter. Given this interpretation of the juvenile statute, a parent's argument
with a neighbor could conceivably result in an emergency justifying instant removal of
the child from the home without further inquiry. Surely child abuse and neglect
statutes and the removal power of the state were not intended to be applied in such a
loose manner.
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these conditions on a family in the absence of abuse or neglect and
it seems anomolous that they are permitted to do so when such con-
ditions are not necessarily related to the abuse conduct which gave
rise to intervention. This permits caseworkers to impose their per-
sonal values on families, thus infringing on family integrity. The
potential for such caseworker abuse increases when the statutory
standards are couched in vague terms and where any adversarial
judicial hearing may not be held for weeks or even months following
removal of the child.
It is imperative that the state assume responsibility for com-
pliance with constitutional prerequisites. Presently the state acts
with broad discretion and assumes that a parent or family aggrieved
by such practices will seek its remedy in a lawsuit. The entire pro-
cess, however, usually occurs in an uneven situation in which the
government has far greater resources and familiarity with legal pro-
In the second case, a twenty-two-year-old mother had custody of her four-year-
old child under a dissolution of marriage decree. During a weekend visitation the
natural father took the child to the hospital emergency room for treatment of a skin
condition which the mother had been treating as a rash. The child allegedly told the at-
tending physician that her mother had burned her. The welfare department was
notified and immediately assumed wardship under an emergency oral order of the
court. The natural father was given custody of the child. Upon further investigation by
the welfare department, it was determined that the child had made conflicting
statements about the origin of her skin condition. The child's pediatrician, after an ex-
amination, diagnosed the condition as insect bites or impetigo. After an informal
meeting of the judge and the welfare department it was suggested that the matter be
heard as a petition for modification of custody in the dissolution court. Nevertheless,
the welfare department refused to return the child to the mother pending the outcome
of the modification hearing. The refusal was based upon the fact that the child had
been taken pursuant to court order (albeit ex parte and oral) and that return of the
child could not be made absent another court order. Although, as customary, a hearing
was set by the court for two months hence, an earlier hearing date was obtained and
a special judge ordered return of the child due to inconclusive evidence of abuse. All of
this occurred within three weeks of the removal.
In this case the welfare department determined abuse and received official oral
sanction of its decision to remove the child. The department then assumed the role of a
dissolution court by effecting temporary custody with the father and placing him in a
strong position to seek and obtain modification of the original custody order. At no
time prior to removal was the mother afforded an opportunity to be heard.
Taken together, these two cases point out the need for clearly defined and ap-
plied standards of neglect and abuse. In neither case was there sufficient evidence to
warrant immediate removal without a hearing. In neither even was there an effort to
hold a hearing within a reasonable time after removal had taken place. These
traumatic experiences can have a profound and lasting effect on parent-child relation-
ships and greater care must be taken in the initiation and determination of removal
proceedings.
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cedures than the typical family which is uninformed in legal in-
tricacies."'
Removal can set into motion a boot-strapping process whereby
the welfare department places itself in a strong position to justify
its actions. It may effectively prepare an argument that in removal
the child's best interests have been met and served simply by
taking numerous steps prior to the adversarial hearing in order to
gain approval of its proposed disposition of the case. For example,
the child may be examined by a physician and provided with full
medical treatment which the parents could not provide. Parents who
fail to provide complete routine immunization and dental care, defi-
ciencies not normally considered neglect in and of themselves, are
disfavored under the best interests test. The state is in a position to
argue that providing such care serves the child's best interests,
while ignoring the fact that the jurisdictional prerequisite of abuse
or neglect may be totally lacking at the outset of the case. As a
result, the state often places the child in a home which can provide
great affluence and cultural exposure to the child. In short the state
has the knowledge and resources to provide middle-class im-
provements in a child's status and further arm itself with arguments
disfavoring return of the child to the home and family. Moreover,
the child of cognitive age may be extremely reluctant to surrender
his newly acquired foster care benefits and return home. In some
cases the courts consider the wishes of the child in determining
what is in the child's best interest. As this pattern develops, it
becomes much easier for the court at the time of the adversarial
hearing to conclude that there was indeed neglect and abuse taking
place at the time of removal. The court may then impose rigorous
middle-class standards upon the parents as a precondition to the
return of their child.' 0 '
103. See, e.g., Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 828 (2d Cir. 1977); Sims v.
State Department of Public Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2371 (1979).
104. Mr. Donald R. Lundberg, an Indianapolis, Indiana, attorney who has
represented a number of families in abuse and neglect proceedings, had this to state
regarding strategy in removal proceedings:
From the strategic standpoint of the parents, there is nothing more im-
portant than having a child still in the home at the time of the hearing.
First, the parents are able to demonstrate that they can adequately care
for the child. Secondly, it is far more difficult for the judge to look at the
parent whose child is yet in the home directly in the eye and say, "I am
removing your child today," than it is for the judge to simply order the
continuation of the status quo for a child already removed.
Interview with Donald R. Lundberg, Attorney at Law, in Indianapolis, Indiana (April
3, 1979).
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As a result of the removal parents are often in so poor an emo-
tional state as to render them incapable of assisting counsel to
prepare for any court hearings. 0 5 Parents may become so traumatized
that they are unable to face their child in regular visits and this too
may be held against them at a later date. Finally, removal is precisely
the opposite of what is needed for a family experiencing disintegra-
tion. It may well be the death knell to the family in trouble. What is
really needed is the opportunity for the family to remain together to
salvage and build upon those positive aspects of the family.
The legalities of removal proceedings must be scrutinized
under two broad considerations; substantive and procedural due pro-
cess. First, it must determined whether the standards for removal
correctly balance the interests of the family, parents, the state, and
children, and secondly, whether, when removal becomes absolutely
necessary, adequate notice and opportunity to be heard are pro-
vided. The establishment of adequate standards for removal is
fraught with many difficulties. First, even experts are unable to
agree when removal should take place.'" Secondly, judges are often
less knowledgeable in child development and psychology. Finally,
caseworkers and others involved in the process are similarly un-
_prepared to deal properly with the complex psychological problems
105. Neglect and abuse proceedings can be a highly emotional experience for the
family, but the unannounced removal of a child is perhaps the most traumatic aspect of'
all. The lawyer who has counselled parents immediately thereafter may find them still
in shock and often receives firsthand exposure to their raw emotional responses, in-
cluding anger, hostility, resentment, sadness, shame, self-pity, frustration, and blame.
Many first interviews with parents are indelibly imprinted in the author's memory.
Caseworkers, attorneys, and judges who are exposed to these emotional expressions
may become hardened and removed to a safe distance by professionalism. However,
for the family members experiencing coercive separation for the first time, the loss
can be devasting.
Aside from being left emotioinally poor, the parents of a removed child or
children may also be financially poorer, thereby compounding the problems of
reuniting the family. In particular, removal results in the termination of AFDC
payments to the family. A parent who is unemployable for one or another reason may
thus have difficulty surviving, let alone getting his family back together. Further com-
plicating matters is the fact that the state may attempt to terminate parental rights if
the parents fail to make sufficient progress toward reuniting the family. These facts
are particullarly ironic when considered in light of the disparity between AFDC
benefits which a family is entitled to while living together and the amount of money
allotted for foster care. For example, Indiana pays $325 per month to a family with
four children under the AFDC program. But the state pays $720 per month in foster
care when the same children are removed from the home. Such disparity clearly
dishonors family integrity.
106. See, e.g., Paulsen, Legal Protection Against Child Abuse, 13 CHILDREN 42
(1966).
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that arise. A number of commentators have noted that removal and
placement decisions often are the result of middle-class
misunderstandings of the poor and the eccentric rather than from
any proven harm to the child." In addition racial and class biases
have been found to play a substantial role in many removal and,
placement decisions.'"
Removal is most often effected under vague standards of
"neglect." In thirty states a finding of neglect can be based on the
parents' inability to provide the child with necessities due to pover-
ty.'" This results in a classic case of blaming the victim. At a
minimum, removal should not be permitted except for those harms
which are jurisdictional; that is, those instances which clearly permit
the court to legally order intervention based upon abuse and
neglect.
With respect to procedural due process and the timing of
adversarial hearing, a number of jurisdictions have condemned
removals absent a prompt hearing."' In recognizing the fundamental
nature of the parent-child relationship, these courts have held that a
crowded court docket does not justify dispensing with a prompt
hearing."'
107. See, e.g., Campbell The Neglected Child. His and His Family's Treatment
Under Massachusetts Law and Practice and Their Rights Under the Due Process
Clause, 4 SUFFOLK L. REV. 631 (1970); Levine, Caveat Parens: A Demystification of the
Child Protections Process, 35 PITT. L. REv. 1 (1973).
108. See Painter v. Bannister, 248 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966); In Re
Booth, 253 Minn. 395, 91 N.W.2d 921 (1958). Although race cannot be a motivating fac-
tor in infringing on parents' fundamental right to the care and custody of a child, race
may be considered in the adoption of a foster child. Drummond v. Fulton County
Department of Family and Children's Serv., 408 F. Supp. 382 (1976), affd, 563 F.2d
1200 (1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
109. KENISTON, supra note 1, at 187.
110. See, e.g., Sims v. Department of Public Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179
(S.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2371 (1979) (Ten Days); Roe v. Conn,
417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782 (W.D.N.C. 1973)
(Five Days); White v. Minter, 330 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Mass. 1972) (Six Months); In Re
C__ , F , and B_ , 497 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. App. 1972); York v. Halley, 534 P.2d
363 (Okla. 1975); LeMaster v. Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1974).
111. In Ives v. Jones, No. 75-0071-R (E.D. Va., decided August 8, 1975), the
court entered a consent order which prohibited summary removal except in emergen-
cies where the child's life or health was in "imminent danger" to the extent that delay
for the provision of the hearing would likely result in irremediable injury. The United
States Supreme Court has set forth constitutional support for this position. In Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 659 (1972), the Court noted that family integrity requires that
parents be given a hearing prior to the forced removal of their child by the state.
In the nonfamily context, the Court has permitted summary intervention into
protected interests in emergency situations. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
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Because removal is such a drastic course of action, it is incum-
bent that it be resorted to in a limited number cases. Four impor-
tant principles for its application emerge. First, the interests of the
parent and the family require that the child be removed only in
those instances where the state clearly demonstrates the child is
facing imminent and serious harm. Secondly, removal without first
holding an adversarial hearing should be limited to those cases
where the serious harm will become irreparable as a result of the
delay necessitated by holding such a hearing. Thirdly, if summary
removal becomes necessary, a full judicial hearing should be held no
later than five to ten days after removal is effected. Finally, the
state must be able to demonstrate that the harm occasioned by the
removal is less damaging than the harm that would result from the
child's continued presence in the home.
The Need for Continued Parent-Child Contact
Once removal becomes necessary and is effected, continued
parent-child contact is vital to the family rehabilitative process. Un-
fortunately studies indicate that continued contact between the
removed child and parent does not often take place. Once a child is
placed in foster care there is a fifty percent chance that the child
will remain there three years or more.' Statistics also reveal that
little or no visitation occurs once the child is placed in foster care.'
There is evidence that the child is benefitted by contact with
the parent even though it may be infrequent. Even relatively few
visits help to prevent the feeling of abandonment and tend to pro-
mote feelings of security. In one study of sixty-one children who had
been in foster care in excess of one year, thirty-three identified with
both the foster and natural parent while seventeen identified
primarily with the natural parent. In the latter case, this was true
even though many were visited infrequently."' Those children who
identified with their natural parents were determined as having the
(1972). See also North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. DiChem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975),
where the Court limited such actions to emergency situations which are carefully cir-
cumscribed. Thus a prior hearing must be held unless it would irreparably frustrate a
substantial state interest.
112. See note 82 supra, and accompanying text.
113. See E. SHERMAN, R. NEUMAN & A. SHINE, CHILDREN ADRIFT IN FOSTER
CARE: A STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES (1974). Their study indicated that only
sixteen per cent of the children were visited bi-weekly or more and twenty-seven per
cent of the children had no cantact at all with their parents.
114. E. WEINSTEIN, THE SELF-IMAGE OF THE FOSTER CHILD 65 (1960).
1979]
Martz: Indiana's Approach to Child Abuse and Neglect: A Frustration of F
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1979
100 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
highest sense of well-being of all the children."' One expert suggests
that a child benefits from two sets of parents. This appears to be
especially true in those cases where the natural parents visit their
children often."'
Every state has some form of statutory provision which per-
mits terminations of parental rights. Although certainly there are
cases that justify total and permanent separation of the parent and
child, it is suggested that such is not always the case. Rather, there
are countless cases where continued parent-child contact would lead
to more stable personal and family relationships. Every opportunity
should be afforded parents and children to visit each other. Indeed
frequent visitation and contact should be encouraged as opposed to
being completely and irrevocably terminated.
INDIANA'S ABUSE AND NEGLECT PRACTICES 117
Indiana's abuse and neglect practices developed under the old
juvenile code," 8 and were superseded by the new code."' The
federal' and state"" welfare statutes and regulations also shaped
these practices. These practices were implemented through the
machinery of the county probation and welfare departments and the
various juvenile courts."
115. Id
116. Wald, supra note 71, at 672.
117. The author's conclusions in this segment of the article are drawn from
personal interviews of six juvenile court judges from six counties in northwestern In-
diana. The interviews were conducted in late 1978 and early 1979 using the same
67-item questionnaire for each judge concerning their practices under the old code and
their analysis of the new code. Counties selected for the survey are demographically
representative of Indiana counties; their populations accordings to the 1975 census
were 12,780, 20,667, 22,919, 105,857, and 546,757. Thus three of the counties were
primarily rural, two are moderately urban and one county is substantially urban. County
size is directly proportionate to the amount of time each judge spends on abuse and
neglect cases. In smaller counties, abuse and neglect cases are infrequent; in medium-
size counties, judges spend about one-half day per week on such cases; in the largest
county, three juvenile court referees devote a substantial amount of their time to
abuse and neglect with approximately 200 petitions per year. The judges surveyed in
age from 32 to 60 years and in experience in juvenile matters from 2 to 16 years.
Supplementing the survey of judges, the author submitted a 33-item ques-
tionaire to each of the six county's welfare departments in 1979. Five of the six depart-
ments responded to the questionaire which was designed to gather specific statistical
data on complaints, placement, return of children, and consented intervention.
118. IND. CODE §§ 31-5-7-1 through 31-5-7-25 (repealed 1979).
119. IND. CODE §§ 31-6-11-21 (Supp. 1979).
120. The Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1976).
121. The Indiana Public Welfare Act, IND. CODE §§ 12-1-1-1 et seq. (1976).
122. In every state welfare program for families are administered on the local
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Each abuse and neglect practice must be examined in light of
its impact on family integrity. Indiana does not treat abuse and
neglect as a family problem requiring family solutions. Instead the
welfare department and the courts focus primarily on the best in-
terests of the child, a focus which often results in removal of the
child from his home. This may protect the child, but only at a
substantial risk to the family. Parents and children are separated in
a high number of cases with few assurances of adequate continued
family association during this period of removal. Moreover, the more
often separation occurs, the greater the likelihood that reuniting
will not take place.
Indiana's practices may be modified under the new code, but
probably not to the extent necessary to assure family integrity con-
sistent with the best interests of the child. By allowing the welfare
department and the courts broad discretion, the new code follows
the style of the old. Additionally the court's traditional reliance on
the welfare department's judgments grants the departments enor-
mous powers. The evil of this arises from the welfare departments'
delegation of discretionary authority to individual case workers.
This delegation of authority to the caseworker permits the interjec-
tion of personal biases in any given case at the initial point of state
contact with the family.1
Abuse and neglect -proceedings begin with a complaint.1 2' After
welfare department investigation and a report to the court, the
level by county departments of public welfare under the direction and supervision of
state welfare departments. In Indiana each county department has two divisions:
eligibility caseworkers who work with families receiving Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Child (AFDC) benefits and caseworkers who work with both AFDC families and
nonwelfare recipient families deemed to be in need of child welfare services. The
federal government pays a substantial portion of the costs to operate these welfare
programs.
123. The "child welfare services" provisions of the Indiana Public Welfare Act
confer responsibility on the state department of public welfare and the various county
departments to protect and care for the homeless, dependent, and neglected children
and children in danger of becoming delinquent. IND. CODE § 12-1-8-1 through -3 (1976).
All of the well-populated counties in Indiana have divisions within their departments
which specialize in working with families and children deemed to be in need of pro-
tected services. These divisions also secure and supervise foster homes and make
placements for those children who are removed from their natural or adoptive homes.
124. According to the survey the most populous county in the survey receives
1,036 complaints per year while the least populous county receives 18 per year. Forty
percent of the complaints are filed by neighbors, twenty percent by teachers, fifteen
percent by AFDC caseworkers, and fifteen percent by other persons. On the average,
sixty-nine percent of all complaints received are determined by the welfare depart-
ments to involve abuse and neglect.
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judge makes a prelimilnary determination of whether it should exer-
cise formal jurisdiction."u The court may then permit the county
probation or welfare department to file a petition alleging dependency
or neglect or that the child is in need of services.'" With the filing of
a petition, the court acquires formal jurisdiction and may order a
disposition of the case after a hearing. The child, however, may be
removed prior to a hearing and without court order by welfare
department action.'"
Statistics reflect that the courts rely heavily on the actions and
recommendations of the welfare department. A welfare department
survey disclosed that courts find abuse or neglect in ninety percent
of all such cases filed. Three-fifths of the counties surveyed in-
dicated that the courts found abuse or neglect in all of the cases
filed. Welfare department recomendations were followed in ninety-
five percent of the cases. Finally, courts make the children wards of
the welfare department, vesting the department with nearly full
discretion as to placement, visitation and conditions for return of
the children to their natural homes in all but a few instances.'"
What these statistics mean is that the welfare departments
most often request wardship which is customarily granted, even
though the old code provided eight other specific dispositions.'" The
new code, likewise, provides eight alternatives to wardship."*
Although wardship in the welfare department is not specifically pro-
vided for in the new code, only experience may disclose a change in
the courts' dispositional practices.
Some indication of the direction the courts will take in inter-
preting the new code may be found in the courts' and welfare
departments' definitional approaches under the old code. Most of the
125. Compare IND. CODE § 31-5-7-8 (repealed 1979), with IND. CODE § 31-6-4-10
(Supp. 1979). Under the new code, the petition is to be filed by the county prosecutor
or attorney for the county welfare department.
126. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-10 (Supp. 1979).
127. Under the old code, removal could occur with a court order, IND. CODE §
31-5-7-9 (repealed 1979), or without an order of the court, IND. CODE § 31-5-7-12 (repealed
1979). The new code permits summary removal to occur either with or without order
of the court or as a dispositional alternative. See IND. CODE §§ 31-6-4-4, -10(e), and -16
(Supp. 1979).
128. Parents aggreived by actions of the welfare department acting under such
broad authority are always entitled to contest the actions in court. The new code,
however, does not require the appointment of counsel until after the parent-child rela-
tionship is terminated. This means that poor families may effectively be barred from
attaching abuses of discretion of the welfare departments.
129. IND. CODE §§ 31-5-7-15 (repealed 1979).
130. IND. CODE §§ 31-6-4-16 (Supp. 1979).
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judges surveyed expressed difficulty in defining the terms depen-
dent or neglected.181 Apparently the welfare departments have as
much difficulty defining these terms as the courts. The surveyed
departments responded that they relied solely on the statutory
definitions.1"
Both judges and case workers consider the best interest of the
child as paramount. All of the judges replied that the best interest
of the child is an inseparable element in the determination of
neglect. The judges' statements of the purpose of wardship varied
widely, but generally centered on protection of the child."M Welfare
departments responded similarly.'" On balance however, four of the
six judges gave a high priority to the rights of the parents. They in-
dicated that in their view, so long as they comply with the law,
parents have the right to control their child until the home becomes
clearly inadequate. They also indicated that parental rights are
equal to or more important than the rights of the criminal defend-
ant."M
131. "Abuse" was defined by all of the judges to mean "intentional injury." On
the other hand, there was no consensus as to the meaning of "neglect." It was defined
as a lack of love or basic necessities; failure to provide for basic needs of the child;
ability to care for the child but failure for one reason or another to do so; a clear
deprivation of necessities; and a failure to give adequate care to the child. While it is
unclear from these various definitions whether judicial focus is on parental conduct or
the harm done to the child, it is significant that none of the judges specifically men-
tioned that they require a showing of harm to the child as part of the proof. Implicit,
however, is the assumption that a showing of substandard care indicates harm to the
child.
132. In identifying neglect, caseworkers look for exploitation of the child; emo-
tional disturbance due to constant friction in the home, marital discord, or mentally-ill
parents, and emotional neglect resulting in insecurity of the child. See INDIANA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE SOCIAL SERVICES MANUAL, 111-4-14, (1976).
133. Two judges indicated that the purpose of wardship is to protect the child
and that the protection interest is paramount. Two other judges indicated that ward-
ship is a step that permits the court to provide an institutional substitute when
parents are not properly caring for the child. Finally, the last two judges indicated
that wardship is designed to provide a period for abatement of the problem until such
a time as the parental deficiencies are corrected.
134. Three county welfare departments view wardship solely as a means of
protecting the child. Two other departments indicated that wardship is designed to not
only protect the child but to provide a time for rehabilitation of the home.
135. Although these judges indicated that parental rights are important, this is
inconsistent with their treatment of welfare department investigations which involve
entry into the home. None of the judges, for example, indicated that they ever excluded
evidence because it was the fruit of an illegal search or seizure. All five of the report-
ing welfare departments said that they inspect homes which are the subject of a com-
plaint, and in most instances without a court order to inspect.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the Fourth Amendment issues in-
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According to the welfare survey, children are removed from
their parents in sixty-five percent of the cases in which the welfare
volved in inspections in Wylman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). As noted, many com-
plaints registered with the welfare department come through the AFDC caseworker
after the regular recertification of eligibility home visit. In Wylman, the Court held
that these visits without a warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment, since the
visits are not searches. The Court concluded that they were not searches because
there is notice, the purpose is limited to gathering information for continued eligibility
and the visits are not "forced or compelled." They are not forced or compelled since
visits can be refused without criminal sanction, although AFDC benefits are forfeited.
Moreover, the Court stressed that the visits were at reasonable hours and the
caseworker conducted the interview only in the living room and not throughout the
house.
Ironically, the AFDC caseworker relates to the parent as a friend and helper. In
many instances, this caseworker represents the family when problems, such as
landlord/tenant conflicts, arise. A much different role is assumed by the same
caseworker when he or she reports possible abuse or neglect to the child welfare divi-
sion. This is especially true when the caseworker later testifies against his client in an
abuse or neglect proceeding. It is incongruous to assume that an AFDC recipient's con-
sent to the recertification interview is also a consent to adversarial use of home obser-
vations in an intervention proceeding.
Besides AFDC caseworker reports, observations of the home may be gathered
in the course of investigation upon complaint of a neighbor, teacher or other person.
Most, if not all, of these observations are made prior to any instruction from the court
to make an investigation.
In these instances, a warrantless search is equally offensive and more legally
suspect. In Re The Wardship of Bender, __ Ind. App. - , 352 N.E.2d 797 (1976).
The Indiana Court of Appeals addressed the Fourth Amendment issues raised by
these investigations. In this case, the welfare department investigator came into the
home on three separate occasions without a warrant and with only questionable con-
sent. On the last occasion, health officials accompanied the department representative.
The purpose of the visit was to summarily take the child and document the home con-
ditions. They looked into the refrigerator, garbage bags, bedrooms, closets, and
drawers. Their observations, supplemented by photographs and memoranda, were ex-
tensively reported in court. Although the Court of Appeals admitted that such un-
consented observations may constitute an unreasonable search and seizure in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, it held that the error was harmless. The court found that
in this case there was sufficient untainted evidence on which the lower court could
base a finding of neglect. Thus the welfare department may bootstrap its contentions
after gathering illegal evidence by admissions of parents or "consented" removal and
placement.
Warrantless administrative searches in the context of OSHA regulations were
recently held violative of the Fourth Amendment. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307 (1978). Obviously, warrantless administrative searches by the welfare department
present a substantially different situation than searches by industrial safety inspec-
tors. If industrial workers are considered unable to protect themselves, how much
more so are children. Nevertheless, the home is a carefully protected place in our
society where the most stringent showings of probable cause are required before
searches are permitted. The greatest dangers of intrusion occur when children are sum-
marily removed in the course of unannounced investigatory inspections.
Moreover, the other basic protections of trial procedure are also frequently not
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department makes a determination of abuse or neglect. All but ten
percent of these children are summarily removed prior to any adver-
sarial hearing. Moreover, the courts deny welfare department re-
quests for removal in only about five percent of the cases. But these
figures do not tell the entire story.
The most disturbing element which underlies these figures is
the vast discrepency in standards of the official mechanisms involved
and the inexcusable delays which result. Judges' standards for grant-
ing emergency removal vary, as do those of the welfare depart-
ments.' " Only one judge reported that an adversary hearing was
held within ten days after removal of filing of the case. Three
judges indicated that hearings typically occur thirty days after
removal or filing, and one judge said the hearing was held between
thirty and sixty days later. This is substantially longer than con-
stitutionally permissible. Moreover, most welfare departments ad-
mitted that alternatives which keep the family together are either
not available or cannot be considered under the circumstances. 7
Child placement thus becomes all the more crucial to preserving
family integrity.
Given the fact that ninety percent of the cases result in
welfare department wardship, serious issues arise concerning the
discretion vested in the departments. Once wardship is granted, the
followed. For example, five of the six judges reported that they do not adhere to the
rules of evidence in abuse and neglect hearings. Also, the judges shift the burden of
proof to the parents to prove fitness, once the petitioning welfare department makes a
prima facie case of abuse or neglect. The judges disagreed about the burden of proof
required.
136. One judge indicated that there has to be substantial neglect. Another said
the child has to be in danger. A third judge requires that the children be unattended
or in a filthy home. The fourth judge states the situation must be imminent in an
abuse neglect and absolutely no responsible person to care for the child in a neglect
case. A fifth judge requires that the situation be desperate, and the sixth judge gave
no response. Three of the judges make no finding of abuse or neglect for issuance of
the emergency order. One of the judges simply puts his reasons on the record. Two of
the judges make findings of fact regarding abuse or neglect.
Only one department reported that the child's life must be in danger to justify
emergency removal. The other departments said that they summarily remove the child
when the child is in immediate danger, or seriously abused or neglected or the health,
welfare and safety of the child require removal.
137. Most departments report they consider counseling and homemaker ser-
vices prior to removal but they are often unworkable solutions. Three of five counties
report the unavailability of homemaker services, day care, or supervised family
facilities in their counties. Use of foster family care is by far the most often used alter-
native when a child is removed. The departments express regret that high caseworker
caseloads prevent any meaningful direct supervision in the home.
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court no longer exercises control over child placement.1" Most often
the welfare departments place the child in foster care.'" Frequently,
two or more children from the same family are split between homes.
In one reporting department, separation occurs in eighty-five per-
cent of the removals."1
0
The effects of separation on family unity are devasting. These
consequences are compounded by the fact that only about fifty-five
percent of the removed children are eventually returned to their
homes."' Additionally children under the age of five are kept out of
the home for periods ranging from two to five years. Finally, visita-
tion rights are severely limited by welfare department discretion.
Typically visitation occurs once per month for one hour at the
welfare department office."2
Unfortunately, unless there are drastic increases in welfare
department resources, meaningful reform in abuse and neglect prac-
tices is unlikely. Rehabilitation of the family is all but a dream so
long as each case worker must handle an average of seventy-five
open abuse or neglect cases. While other community agencies may
help, the most effective rehabilitative agent, the case worker, is
precluded from engaging in direct, comprehensive family treatment.
To some extent the caseload problems of the departments are self
inflicted. Funds which might otherwise be spent hiring additional
138. All judges indicate that placement in foster family care is left entirely up
to the welfare department. None of the judges look into the adequacy of the foster.
home for the reason that foster homes must meet state welfare department licensing
requirements. One judge lamented that the court never has any idea in which foster
home the child or children are placed and that the welfare department shifts children
from one foster home placement to another without court approval.
139. The survey indicates that welfare departments place sixty percent of the
children in foster homes, fifteen percent in institutions, ten percent with relatives, and
fifteen percent of the children remain with a parent. All of the judges report foster
family care is the first alternative sought in placing children. Both the welfare depart-
ments and the judges agree that institutions are one of the least desirable alternatives
and that children should be placed in group homes when individual foster families are
not available.
140. For a moving description of the trauma experienced by children separated
in different foster home, see K. HAYES & A. LASSARINO, BROKEN PROMISE (1978).
141. In those counties surveyed, the highest rate of return is eighty-five per-
cent and the lowest rate is fifteen percent.
142. Only one department permits weekly visitation by the parents. Two
departments permit foster home visitation and, depending on the circumstances, over-
night visits in the parents' home. Among those reasons most often cited for such
limitations are parental disinterest, a hesitancy to disrupt the child's adjustment in the
foster home, foster parent bias against visitation, and the lack of sufficient staff to
supervise visitation.
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caseworkers and other rehabilitation personel are channeled into
providing foster care for children which might have remained in the
home. Judges, however, fail to perceive that insufficient efforts are
directed into rehabilitation. Four of the six responding judges stated
that the departments in their jurisdictions made reasonable efforts
to return children to their homes. None of the judges reported
ordering the welfare department to provide rehabilitative
services."'
The problems with judges' perceptions of abuse and neglect
proceedings do not end here however. The powers of the court are
consistently misconstrued by the judges. For instance, all reporting
judges believed that they may terminate parental rights in juvenile
court, even though the old code did not provide for such termina-
tion.'" Moreover, both courts and welfare departments construe
"wardship" under the old code to mean either temporary or perma-
nent wardship. Permanent wardship is thus tantamount to termina-
tion."5 Although the new code fails to provide clearly defined in-
voluntary standards and procedures, judges can be expected to ter-
minate parental rights when they deem it justified, as they have in
the past."'
THE NEW INDIANA JUVENILE CODE
In response to growing dissatisfaction with the 1907 Indiana
Juvenile Code,"' the Indiana Legislature enacted a new version ef-
fective October 1, 1979. '" The old code primarily focused on parental
conduct rather than family integrity. In permitting the overuse of
removal as a dispositional alternative, the old act did not adequately
assure the maintenance of the parent-child relationship." ' In seeking
143. One judge commented that most cases of physical neglect could be
remedied best while the child is in the home. Unfortunately, there are insufficient
funds for the necessary supervision and services that such an alternative would re-
quire. This judge concluded that the current emphasis on removal and foster care is
misplaced. Rather, the thrust of the effort should be on services in the home.
144. Two judges state they terminate the parent-child relationship only when
there is no hope of rehabilitation or of ever returning the child to the natural home.
145. See in the Matter of Perkins, __ Ind. App. -_, 352 N.E.2d 502 (1976);
In Re Bender, - Ind. App. - , 352 N.E.2d 797 (1976).
146. See IND. CODE § 31-6-5-4 (Supp. 1979). The termination test as enunciated
in In The Matter of Perkins, __ Ind. App. -, 352 N.E.2d 502 (1976), should remain
relevant. Three inquiries are pertinent: the length of the history of abuse or neglect;
the probability of continued abuse or neglect; and the best interest of the child's future
welfare in terminating the parent-child relationship.
147. IND. CODE §§ 31-5-4-3 through 31-5-5-4 (repealed 1979).
148. IND. CODE §§ 31-6-1-2 through 31-6-4-19 (Supp. 1979).
149. See generally IND. CODE §§ 31-5-7-5 through 31-5-7-6 (repealed 1979).
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to remedy these shortcomings, the general assembly made
significatnt modifications in the procedures and standards for state
intervention.
. The new code has been incorporated into Indiana's family law
statutory scheme. Ostensibly the new code emphasizes family
autonomy and integrity. Indeed the law as enacted includes the pur-
pose "to strengthen family life by assisting parents to fulfill their
parental obligations . . . ."" However a closer examination of the
new code reveals a continued pronounced emphasis on the child
rather than the family. For example the designation of "dependent
or neglected" has merely been replaced by the term "Child in Need
of Services."'5 1 Likewise, the standards for intervention have been
revised to focus on harm to the child rather than parental conduct.'"
Under the dispositional alternatives section, emphasis is placed on
the safety of the community and the child.'5 Finally, the new code
provides for progress hearings every nine months to determine the
appropriateness of the child's present placement.'"
These isolated statutory provisions, however, do not adequately
or fairly depict the precise nature of the act. In order to undertake
a proper analysis of the degree to which the state intends to honor
family integrity, the new code must be examined with respect to
seven critical stages: investigation, placement, visitation, voluntary
150. See IND. CODE §§ 31-6-1-1 (Supp. 1979).
151. See IND. CODE § 31-6-4-3 (Supp. 1979). A major critism of the new act is
that the delinquency and CHINS provisions are in the same chapters and sections with
same or similar language used to deal with both concepts. In some instances, deliquency
terms are used to set CHINS standards. The purposes, considerations, and interests at
stake of state, parents, children and families, are distinctly different for delinquency as
compared to abuse or neglect. The act, therefore, more properly should have been
divided into two separate, distinct parts; one dealing with delinquency only and the
other with CHINS.
152. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-11 (Supp. 1979).
153. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-16, -19 (Supp. 1979). Under these sections of the code,
the court is to provide in the dispositional decree "a reasonable opportunity for the
participation by the child's parent," and is to consider in the progress reviews "the ex-
tent to which the parent has visited the child, including the reasons for infrequent
visitation." There are, however, no specific provisions ensuring the right to continued
meaningful family association during the period of time that the court has jurisdiction.
Thus, family integrity is not taken into account and is not afforded necessary protec-
tion by the State.
154. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-19 (Supp. 1979). This progress report section appears to
indicate a legislative opposition to family integrity. In order to prevail at such a hear-
ing, "the state must show that the child should not be returned to the parent, guar-
dian, or custodian." It would seem from this language, however, that the legislature
does not deem that the state gains when the family is reunited.
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removal, rehabilitative services, termination standards, and the
right to counsel.lu
Investigation
The new code permits any person to give the juvenile court in-
take officer written information indicating that a child is in need of
services. '" The officer then makes a preliminary inquiry or informal
investigation into the child's background, current status and school
performance."7 The act gives broad discretion to the court officer
without placing limitations on the manner and extent of fact gather-
ing.
In Sims v. State Department of Public Welfare,M the court
made it clear that the mandate of due process extends to the in-
vestigative stage of state action into the privacy of the family.
Under this rule the family must have access to the fruits of the in-
vestigation, including reports and records, so that it can be fully ap-
prised of the nature of the accusations made by the state. Severe
legislative restriction on the nature of the investigation, the use of
psychological or psychiatric examinations, and the dissemination of
information prior to an adversarial proceeding and subsequent
judicial determination would also seem to be required. Permitting
an investigation without these safeguards is a violation of due pro-
cess and the right of privacy. By failing to impose restrictions on
the investigative process, the act has increased the chance for viola-
tion of these rights.
Similarly, the new code does not impose any limitations on
observation and fact gathering in the home. The United States
Supreme Court has condemned warrantless administrative searches
for purposes of housing inspections, 8" and warrantless ad-
ministrative searches for purposes of fire inspections." It would
155. The Indiana Child Welfare Act of 1978 reflects some of the best current
thought in the neglect area and takes account of each of these considerations. One sec-
tion which was proposed, but was omitted from the final version of the act, would have
clarified the distinction between parental conduct and actual harm to the child. Poverty,
inadequate housing, alcohol abuse or other non-conforming social behaviors on the part
of the parent or the extended family were not to be deemed prima facie evidence that
serious physical or emotional damage to the child had or would occur.
156. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-8 (Supp. 1979).
157. Id.
158. 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2371
(1979).
159. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
160. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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seem that the fundamental right to family integrity which directly
involves family relationships requires an even higher level of protec-
tion. Here, not only are the physical conditions of the family abode
being invaded, but in addition these observations intrude into very
personal, intimate family relationships. In Wyman v. James,"6 ' the
United States Supreme Court permitted observations in the home
for purposes of the recertification of welfare benefits. However,
clearly such observations are distinguishable from those which are
performed for the purpose of possible coercive intervention. In In
Re the Wardship of Bender,"' the Indiana Court of Appeals held
that the Fourth Amendment protects the family in abuse and
neglect proceedings. However, it also held that use of illegally ob-
tained evidence in that case was harmless error after reviewing the
entire record. There must be an initial determination as to the
legality of the methods utilized to obtain evidence, without con-
sideration of its substance. To consider the evidence in light of the
entire record is to fail to recognize the unavoidable prejudicial effect
on the judge at the time of introduction. The new code must exlicitly
guarantee this Fourth Amendment protection.
Removal
Removal is by far the most critical and drastic stage of abuse
and neglect proceedings. This is particularly true of summary
removal where there is no opportunity for an adversarial hearing.
Under the new code a child alleged to be in need of services can be
removed from the home by use of one of three procedures. Removal
can be accomplished with'u or without'" a court order. In either in-
stance the removal is summary and therefore without an adversarial
hearing, although a detention hearing is required within seventy-two
hours after removal.'" The child may also be removed after a full
adversarial hearing on the issue.'
The code properly acknowledges that a child should not be
removed absent a showing of clear harm and that an adversarial
hearing must be held quickly. However there are no provisions
restricting summary removal to cases where irreparable harm
would be caused by the delay to hold a hearing nor does the code re-
161. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
162. __ Ind. App. __ , 352 N.E.2d 797 (1976).
163. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-4(c) (Supp. 1979).
164. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-10 (Supp. 1979).
165. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-6 (Supp. 1979).
166. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-16 (Supp. 1979).
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quire the state to show that the removal is less harmful than the
harm occurring in the home. As a result of these deficiencies, of-
ficials responsible for summarily removing a child are permitted to
apply subjective standards for removal. Moreover once the child is
summarily removed, even after an adversarial hearing, the court is
free to ratify the removal and to impose substantial conditions upon
the family for return of the child.
The new code provides that a child may be taken into custody
by any law enforcement officer under an order of the court. 7 It fur-
ther permits removal without a court order by any law enforcement
officer, probation officer, or case worker acting with probable cause
to believe that the child is in need of services.'" As originally
enacted the code permitted removal if it appeared that the child
might be injured. This vagueness permitted too much discretion
because any injury, regardless of its severity, could justify removal.
The standard clearly has been tightened so as to require serious
harm to the child as a prerequisite to removal.'
The code enumerates four separate grounds for detention: upon
a reasonable belief to protect the child; the child is unlikely to ap-
pear for subsequent proceedings; there exists a reasonable basis for
the child's request not to be released; or the parent is unwilling or
unable to take custody of the child.' 0 Therefore, under the new code
a child may also be removed from the home pursuant to a court
order but without any adversarial hearing. This type of removal oc-
curs after a petition which alleged that the child is in need of ser-
vices has been authorized for filing. With the support of sworn
testimony or an affidavit, the petitioner may request that the child
be removed. The court may grant the request by making written find-
ings of fact that at least one of the foregoing grounds for detention
167. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-4 (Supp. 1979).
168. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-4(c) (Supp. 1979).
169. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
170. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-6(d) (Supp. 1979). Several concerns are raised by these
standards. First, while Section 31-6-4-6 was amended by the legislature in 1979 to
clearly apply to a child in need of services, these detention standards are almost iden-
tical to those applied to a delinquent child under Section 31-6-4-5. The term "detention"
is a delinquency concept similar to the adult criminal term "incarceration" and focuses
on the restraint of the child's liberty. These standards do not, however, lend
themselves to addressing the liberty and privacy interests of the family. Second, the
statute is totally unclear as to what the child is to be protected from or the degree of
harm that must be present. The result is to permit broad discretion in the summary
removal process because the actions of the removing party are not first subject to
adversarial scrutiny.
1979]
Martz: Indiana's Approach to Child Abuse and Neglect: A Frustration of F
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1979
112 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
exists.' Similarly when the child is removed without a court order,
the intake officer is required to investigate the reasons for deten-
tion and may remove the child if one of the enumerated standards is
met.'" Thus the person removing the child initially without a court
order is required to believe only that the child is seriously impaired
or seriously endangered while the intake officer must reasonably
believe that the child is in need of protective services.
Once the child is removed, with7 3 or without 7' court order, a
detention hearing must be held within seventy-two hours after
custody, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. This is a
substantial improvement over the act as originally passed. Under
the original act, if the child was removed without a court order, the
court was apparently obligated to hold a detention hearing within
forty-eight hours. 7 5 However, if removal occurred by court order
pursuant to a request supported by sworn testimony and affidavit,
there was apparently no detention hearing requirement.' The child
in effect could be removed and kept out of the home for an in-
definite period without any adversarial determination. The amended
language requiring a hearing within seventy-two hours for all cases
of summary removal clearly meets the Roe v. Conn'" and Ives v.
Jones 78 requirement for an adversarial hearing within ten days
after removal.
When removal is supported by a full fact-finding hearing, the
court may place the child in another home or foster care facility. 17
This method of removal best honors family integrity because it is ef-
fected only after a full adversarial hearing on the issue of abuse or
neglect. Further, however, the court should be obligated, when con-
sistent with the safety of the community and the welfare of the
child, to enter a dispositional decree that least interferes with family
autonomy and privides a reasonable opportunity for participation by
the child's parents. Other alternatives which afford parental par-
ticipation are home supervision, voluntary rehabilitative treatment,
and placement with the extended family. If the court fully
171. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-10(e) (Supp. 1979).
172. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-6 (Supp. 1979).
173. IND. CODE §§ 31-6-4-6 and 31-6-4-10(e) (Supp. 1979).
174. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-4 (Supp. 1979).
175. IND. CODE §§ 31-6-4-4 and 31-6-4-5 (Supp. 1979), as originally enacted.
176. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-10(e) (Supp. 1979).
177. 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
178. No. 75-0071-R (E.D. Va., decided August 8, 1975).
179. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-16 (Supp. 1979).
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recognizes family integrity, removal as an alternative will take place
only after all these other less intrusive measures have been ex-
hausted.
Placement
Placement of the child is the second most crucial aspect of the
child in need of services proceeding. Placement away from the family
must be pursued only in those cases where supervision and counsel-
ing cannot adequately protect the child while remaining in the family.
Placement alternatives, however, should be considered in order com-
mencing with that which is least traumatic and disruptive to the
family."s Placement should maximize the chances of reuniting the
family. It should provide adequate physical and emotional care of
the child and at the same time offer the best chances for continued
family association.' The code is conspicuously silent on guidelines
for temporary placement prior to an adversarial or dispositional
hearing. The child removed without court order may be released to
parents or placed as designated by the juvenile authorities.""2
Current placement practices indicate that the Department of
Public Welfare has wide discretion as to placement after either sum-
mary proceedings or a judicial determination. The welfare depart-
ment chooses the type of placement and moves the child without
court approval or an adversarial hearing. In most cases once neglect
of abuse is determined the court simply ratifies the summary
removal and placement. The child then becomes a ward of the
welfare department which has full discretion for placement
thereafter. These placement practices do not provide adequate
checks on the exercise of judicial or departmental discretion.
Under the new code, it appears that upon summary removal
the court can simply ratify the emergency placement or recommen-
180. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 777 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
181. It is for these reasons that a preferred order of placement should be
adopted and used in determining the proper placement of a child. For example, the
preferred placement might be the extended family (aunts, uncles, grandparents),
followed by a foster family (a family takes the child into its home), a licensed group
home (a married couple acts as parents to a number of removed children in a simulated
family home), and finally a licensed institution (care is provided by an administrative
staff and employees).
As originally enacted, the new code provided a similar preferred order of place-
ment for children removed without a court order. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-6(a) (Supp. 1979).
No preferred order was set out for children removed through a court order. IND. CODE
§ 31-6-4-10 (Supp. 1979).
182. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-6(c) (Supp. 1979).
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dation of the department, or it can simply delegate the authority for
placement to the welfare department. Thus the new code contains
no provisions for reformation of Indiana's current placement prac-
tices. No specific placement alternatives are set forth nor are there
clear guidelines to assist the court or the department in placement.
Visitation and Contact
Removal and placement call into question the important issue
of continued family visitation and contact. It would seem that the
fundamental right to family integrity requires the court to permit
and even facilitate the exercise of substantial visitation and
contact.'" In practice, however, visitation is left entirely up to the
welfare department. It is usually set no more often than once per
month, frequently in the welfare office for approximately one hour
under the supervision of a caseworker. The usual reason given for
such limited visitation is lack of sufficient welfare personnel.
Another factor sometimes preventing meaningful visitation is that
the child may be located at such a distance that frequent visitation
is made impossible.
The code, which is silent on visitation and contact, ought to
outline specific guidelines requiring the state to permit frequent and
meaningful private visitation and contact among the family consis-
tent with the protection of the child. This arguably is not only re-
quired by the constitutional right to family integrity but it is also a
rational approach to the ultimate goal of reuniting the family.
Voluntary Removal and Other Forms of Voluntary Intervention
The problems connected with removal, placement and limita-
tions placed on continued family association are not always created
by coercive intervention. The state's use of parental consent for
removal or other forms of voluntary intervention presents a key
issue. The code expressly protects the child from waiver of constitu-
tional rights except under carefully defined conditions. There is no
such provision for the protection of parents in the waiver of their
constitutional rights except at the termination stage.'" The written
183. The only mention of visitation in the new code is contained in Section
31-6-4-19(b)(3). Under this section the court may consider the extent of visitation in
reviewing a request for modification of the original decree. The code, however, con-
tains no mandatory provisions regarding visitation.
184. IND. CODE § 31-6-5-3 (Supp. 1979), provides that upon voluntary termination
of the parent-child relationship, the parents must be advised as to their rights and to
the nature of the consequences of termination.
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consent to temporary wardship is a typical kind of waiver used in
Indiana. This initial step may lead to removal, placement and
ultimate termination of the parent-child relationship. It is vital that
parents understand what they are surrendering by consent and that
the court determine that the consent is voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently given. Sometimes the welfare department seeks welfare
assistance.'" As detected by the Supreme Court in Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families:' "
The extent to which supposedly "voluntary placements"
are in fact voluntary has been questioned on other
grounds as well. For example, it has been said that many
"voluntary" placements are in fact coerced by threat of
neglect proceedings and are not in fact voluntary in the
sense of an informed consent.'"
Such a use of voluntary consent forms by the welfare department
should be expressly limited or carefully regulated by the new code
to protect the family from unwarranted state intervention.
Family Rehabilitative Services
The new code permits the state to petition for parental par-
ticipation in a program of care and rehabilitative treatment for the
child.'" Presumably this is intended to be family rehabilitation. Yet
185. See, e.g., Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1977).
186. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
187. Id. at 834.
188. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-17 (Supp. 1979). Under this provision, the parents'
failure to participate in care or rehabilitation of their child can lead to the termination
of their relationship. Under the threat of this powerful sanction, the state can dictate
with whom and in what manner treatment and rehabilitation takes place. The efficacy
of a system that forces an individual to choose between the privacy of the parent-child
relationship and the right to personal autonomy must seriously be questioned. As one
expert has noted:
Though obvious once said, when left unsaid, the limitations of law often
go unacknowledged in discussion about child placement. Too infrequently
there is attributed to law and its agents a magical power-a power to do
what is far beyond its means. While the law may claim to establish rela-
tionships, it can in fact do little more than give them recognition and pro-
vide an opportunity for them to develop. The law, so far as specific in-
dividual relationships are concerned, is a relatively crude instrument. It
may be able to destroy human relationships; but it does not have the
power to compel them to develop.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 49-50.
One major concern with required parental counseling as a condition for the
return of the child is the additional requirement that the complete results of the
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there is no provision for the parent to initiate rehabilitation or for
the funding of such treatment. Neither is there any provision
recognizing parental discretion as to treatment though rehabilitation
should be available as a matter of choice before other forms of state
intervention.
Although the new code does not confer the right to family
rehabilitative services, a strong case for such treatment can be
made by analogizing to mental commitments and juvenile delinquency
proceedings. In a case of mental commitment, the state has a com-
pelling interest for restraining the patient's liberty to protect the
patient or society. The courts have held, however, that deprivation
of liberty without provision for adequate treatment violates due pro-
cess.'" Similarly, in delinquency proceedings, the juvenile is entitled
to rehabilitative treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Nelson v. Heyne,'" the court noted:
A new concept of substantive due process is evolving in
the therapeutic realm. This concept is founded upon a
recognition of the concurrency between the state's exer-
cise of sanctioning powers and its assumption of the
duties of social responsibility. Its implication is that effec-
tive treatment must be quid pro quo for society's right to
exercise its parens patriae controls.
Thus it can be argued that once the state, acting as parens patriae,
intervenes into protected family interests effective treatment is con-
stitutionally required. Even though a family may be experiencing
disintegration, the right to family rehabilitative services in an effort
to preserve family integrity keeps the family free from state in-
terference until the state demonstrates serious harm to the child.
This right to family integrity, both before and after intervention,
counseling be disclosed to the welfare department and courts. This would appear to
seriously threaten meaningful counseling.
189. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.
Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
190. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).
191. 1& at 359.
In Callis v. Railey, NA 79-132-C (S.D. Ind. Filed Sept. 21, 1979), plaintiffs are
alleging that the Clark County, Indiana Welfare Department failed to develop a plan to
return children to their homes after removal. The cause of action is based on 42 U.S.C.
§ 608 (1976), and regulations found at 45 C.F.R. 233.110 (1978), as well as equal protec-
tion and due process grounds. See also Hancock v. Clark County Department of Public
Welfare, 79A16 (Clark County Circuit Court, filed March 29, 1979). The Eastern
District of Louisiana recently analyzed the constitutional issues in such cases in Gary
W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976).
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continues with the same force and intensity. The state is therefore
should be required to take those rehabilitative measures calculated
to restore the family and provide a safe environment for the child.
Termination
Ultimately the severest state action against the family is the
termination of the parent-child relationship. There is a serious ques-
tion as to whether the parent-child relationship should ever be in-
voluntarily and totally terminated so long as there exists any func-
tion which the parent can adequately exercise and fulfill.'" In the
absence of a showing that continued exercise of the relationship will
result in serious harm to the child there is no valid reason to ter-
minate it. It may be possible for the natural parents to share their
responsibility with surrogate parents without seriously harming the
child. There is a tendency to completely terminate the relationship
because of the adult perception that the parenting obligation should
not be shared. This perception may be a reflection of the last re-
maining vestiges of the concept that children are properly subject to
exclusive parental control. In terms of the human dimensions and
the purpose of family life, it makes more sense to preserve at least a
limited parent-child relationship rather than to terminate it com-
pletely and permanently.
At a minimum the state should be required to show that more
harm is likely to befall the child by staying with or maintaining con-
tact with the parents than by permanently separating the parent
and child. ' " No such requirement is set forth in the new code. The
new code does suggest, however, that prior to involuntary termina-
tion of the parent-child relationship the state must show that
reasonable services have been offered to the parent to assist in
fulfilling parental obligations. '" This provides an important protec-
tion for the family relationship.
Right to Counsel
The new code is clearly lacking in its provisions for aid of
counsel.'" The court is obligated to appoint counsel for the parents
192. Wald, supra note 71, at 672-73.
193. See Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 24 (S.D. Iowa 1975), affl'd,
545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
194. IND. CODE § 31-6-5-3(6)(C) (Supp. 1979).
195. A number of states have recognized the consitutional right to counsel in
abuse and neglect cases. See, e.g., In Re B, 30 N.Y.2d 352, 2815 N.E.2d 288 (1972); State
v. Jamison, 251 Ore. 114, 444 P.2d 15 (1968); In the Matter of Luscier, 84 Wash. 2d 135,
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only in termination proceedings and may appoint counsel to repre-
sent parental interests in any other proceedings.1 " The problem
with mandating counsel for parents only at the termination pro-
ceedings is that it is often too late for counsel to do much more than
to assure that procedural due process is afforded. The parent may
have been deprived of counsel at the equally important stages of
removal, placement, and prescription of rehabilitative services.
While the availability of counsel to the parents is certainly limited,
the access to counsel for children is severely limited. Under the Act
the court is not obligated to appoint counsel for the child except in
delinquency proceedings." When the child is not represented the
state jeopardizes family integrity in its zeal to protect the child.
The constitutional right to counsel at early states of abuse and
neglect proceedings has been recognized1" by at least one court
which reasoned that since counsel must be made available at every
critical stage in a criminal proceeding, counsel must also be made
available immediately following removal of the child. Since the new
code fails to mandate that counsel be made available at every
critical stage of the proceeding, it is conceivable the code could not
withstand constitutional challenge.
RECOMMENDATIONS
There is no doubt that the new code is the result of a signifi-
cant attempt of the part of the Indiana Legislature to modernize
child and neglect practices and procedures. This is primarily
evidenced by substantial revision in the jurisdictional standards
which focus on the seriousness of the harm done to the child rather
than on parental conduct.'" In addition to this noteworthy change,
there are other significant improvements in the new code. For exam-
ple, the new code requires the petition to contain a considerably
more specific delineation of the basis for jurisdiction, a concise state-
ment of of the facts upon which the allegation is based, and a
reference to the section of the code supporting the petition. These
provisions comport with the constitutional requirement of adequate
524 P.2d 906 (1974). Most recently the Alaska Supreme Court extended the right to
counsel an indigent child custody litigants in a private custody dispute between
parents. See Flores v. Flores, 48 U.S.L.W. 1027 (1979).
196. IND. CODE § 31-6-7-2(b) (Supp. 1979).
197. IND. CODE § 31-6-7-2(a) (Supp. 1979).
198. Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla. 1978). See also authority cited
in note 195 supra.
199. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-3 (Supp. 1979).
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notice.' In an effort to provide further flexibilities the code also
permits an informal adjustment period.2"' Under this program an
abuse and neglect case can be handled informally for a six month
period which may be renewed for an additional six months. This can
be an effective tool for keeping children in the home rather than
summarily or dispositionally removing them. The pending petition
can be a motivating force for prompting recalcitrant parents to
undertake their parental responsibilities. The new Indiana Code
therefore provides significant substantive changes in the handling of
abuse and neglect cases.
In addition to the substantive changes, the new code adopts
numerous procedural adjustments designed to more adequately pro-
tect the rights of the parties. For example, the judicial proceedings
are divided into four distinct phases: the initial or preliminary hear-
ing,"" the fact finding hearing,"' the predispositional stage,"' and
the dispositional hearing.20 The initial hearing is designed to deter-
mine representation for the child and to simply inform the family of
the nature of the proceedings and to provide them with the oppor-
tunity to obtain their own counsel. The fact-finding hearing assures
that all parties to the proceeding are made aware of the basis for
the actions taken by the petitioner. The predispositional stage af-
fords parents and others the opportunity to submit alternative
recommendations for disposition of the case. All of these steps are
designed to ultimately provide the family with information sufficient
for them to have meaningful input into the disposition of the child.
The new code similarly takes steps to assure that once a
dispositional decree has been rendered, ample opportunity is given
for a periodic review of the placement. The periodic review provi-
sion' requires a review by the court every nine months after the
decree removing the child from the home thus assuring that neither
the child nor the family are left in an unsettled state for an in-
definite period of time. The court has a duty to determine the pro-
priety of any modification in the original dispositional decree. Every
eighteen months the statute mandates the court to hold a formal
hearing on the question of its continued jurisdiction. These periodic
200. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-10 (Supp. 1979).
201. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-12 (Supp. 1979).
202. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-13.5 (Supp. 1979).
203. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-14 (Supp. 1979).
204. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-15 (Supp. 1979).
205. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-16 (Supp. 1979).
206. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-19 (Supp. 1979).
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reviews are of significant assistance in determining the effec-
tiveness of any rehabilitative treatment presents one of the more
positive means for restoring family integrity.
Just as the new code has made significant strides in abuse and
neglect proceedings it is also apparent that it is riddled with signifi-
cant shortcomings. There is a particular need for clearer and more
definitive statements of policy and procedure. The purposes of the
code should be recited and expressly include the facilitation of family
autonomy and integrity consistent with the protection of the child.
There should be express Fourth Amendment guarantees applicable
to all investigations of abuse and neglect. Summary removal provi-
sions should be amended to allow dispensation of the adversarial
hearing only when delay caused by that hearing would result in
serious irreparable harm to the child. Moreover the statute should
require the state to clearly demonstrate that removal of the child
would be less harmful than the harm experienced in the home.
Special attention should be drawn to assuring that the least in-
trusive dispositional alternative is implemented consistent with the
protection of the child. Currently the court has no specific guidelines
for making a determination. The code should also explicitly require
review and approval of all child placements. Regular, frequent, and
substantial private visitation and association should be expressly
guaranteed consistent with the protection of the child. Consented in-
tervention should be prescribed except when the court adequately
determines that consent and any waiver of rights are knowingly, in-
telligently, and voluntarily given. The right to rehabilitative ser-
vices should be guaranteed regardless of economic or social position
of the family and should include the right to seek voluntary treat-
ment from qualified sources; treatment in which the confidential
nature of the treating relationship is privileged and respected. The
coercive termination standards should be more clearly enunciated.
Termination should not be permitted in a relatively short period of
time after removal unless the state can show that the parent is
financially able to establish a proper home but refuses or fails to do
so. The parents' right to counsel should be guaranteed at every
critical stage of the proceedings. Finally the standard of proof
should be beyond a reasonable doubt due to the liberty and privacy
interests at stake.W
207. Under IND. CODE § 31-6-7-13 (Supp. 1979), the standard of proof at any
stage of CHINS proceeding is a mere preponderance of the evidence. The courts have
made it clear that the fundamental right to family integrity requires that at the very
least the allegations be proven by clear and convincing evidence. They also strongly
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CONCLUSION
There are many important reasons for protecting the family
from state intervention. There is substantial evidence that abuse
and neglect intervention is too broadly exercised resulting in in-
creased encroachment on family autonomy. Clearly current removal
and placement practices fail to either adequately shield children
from unnecessary trauma or to protect the sanctity of the family.
There are numerous steps which can be taken to remedy these
deficiencies. First there must be a concerted legislative effort to pro-
mote the preservation of the family consistent with the goal of pro-
tecting the child. Secondly coercive removal should be prohibited ex-
cept when there is actual or imminent serious harm to the child and
then only if the removal will be less harmful than non-removal. Sum-
mary removal should be limited to cases where a delay caused by a
proper hearing would result in irreparable harm to the child. In all
cases the means of protecting the child should be those which least
intrude into the family unit. In short, the emerging constitutional
right to family integrity must be employed to not only protect the
family but to develop specific statutory standards and procedures.
imply that since termination of the parent-child relationship is akin to a delinquency
proceeding which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, termination also should
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp.
10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976). See also Sims v. State Dep't of
Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct.
2371 (1979). The CHINS provision of the new code should therefore properly reflect
these holdings and require the higher standards of proof.
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